Governance *for* Sustainable Development

VOLUME 6

Volume 6: Implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Addressing Key Climate and Environmental Issues

Edited by the Friends of Governance for Sustainable Development

NEW WORLD FRONTIERS
publications

Published by New World Frontiers

Contents

Foreword by Oche Agbo, Meriem El Hilali, Sungjun Kim, Yvonne Mewengkang, Andreea Mocanu, Ulrich Nicklas, David Banisar, Felix Dodds and Quinn McKew

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Biographies

Papers presented to the Friends of Governance for Sustainable Development workshops in 2021:

Foreword

Oche Agbo, Meriem El Hilali, Sungjun Kim, Yvonne Mewengkang, Andreea Mocanu, Ulrich Nicklas, David Banisar, Felix Dodds and Quinn McKew

The Friends of Governance for Sustainable Development was originally set up in 2010 to help Member States prepare for the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20).

The Friends group was re-established during the Open Working Group for the Post 2015 Development Agenda in 2014. The group is coordinated by the governments of Germany, Morocco, Nigeria, Romania, Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea, with technical support from the Tellus Institute and ARTICLE 19 serving as the secretariat. The group aims to create an informal space for Member States to discuss governance-related issues.

The Friends group has continued to host workshops on governance-related issues pertaining to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, and the Paris Climate Agreement.

The Friends group recognises that the 2030 Agenda represents one of the most important sets of Global Goals that the international community has committed to up to this point. It is an unprecedented effort that embodies universal aspirations for achieving a more just, equitable, peaceful and sustainable future. It is a prime example of successful multilateralism that builds on the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and serves as a major action plan to help deliver the Paris Climate Agreement.

This ambitious and unique exercise represents a paradigm shift in policymaking for sustainable development. It gives a roadmap by which the United Nations, governments, and stakeholders can work together to address the most pressing global challenges. In this context, the rule of law, as well as effective, robust, participatory and accountable institutions, are of the utmost importance in delivering the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and their 169 targets.

This is the sixth book that the Friends group has published, and its chapters are based on some of the presentations made at the three workshops hosted by the Friends group in 2021.

In 2021, during the second year of the pandemic, the Friends group convened UN officials, experts, and representatives from governments worldwide at three participatory workshops on relevant governance issues.

The workshops were organized in partnership with the UN-DESA Office of Intergovernmental Support and Coordination for Sustainable Development and focused on providing open space for Member States to discuss issues they would be addressing in 2021 and 2022. Having the opportunity to hear what experts think is useful for governments dealing with these pressing issues. We hope this publication will serve as useful input for the ongoing discussions about the institutional architecture for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The first workshop looked at ways to accelerate the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The second workshop looked at SDG 16 as a cross-cutting goal addressing health, climate change, energy, and food security. The third workshop looked at the issues

in front of the United Nations Environment Assembly 5.2 and a review of the outcomes from the Glasgow Climate Change Summit.

In 2022 the Friends group will continue to be a place for discussions of the institutional architecture for the 2030 Agenda's implementation, the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the Paris Climate Agreement, and each agreement's respective follow-up and review.

We know that sustainable development will only become a reality if we have an environment that enables it to happen. Good governance will be pivotal in implementing, reviewing, and improving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. We hope this publication contributes to addressing the challenges we will be facing over the coming years to 2030.

Biographies

Zak Bleicher is the International Fund for Agriculture Development's (IFAD) representative at UN Headquarters in New York. In that capacity, he works to provide UN Member States with policy and technical advice as it relates to rural transformation in the context of realizing the objectives of the 2030 Agenda; provides strategic guidance and support to IFAD's engagement within the UN; and, seeks to build on and expand IFAD's partnerships with all stakeholders in relation to IFAD's mission.

From March 2020 through December 2021, Zak was seconded by IFAD to the Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General (EOSG) to provide strategic support to UN Leadership around the Secretary-General's Food Systems Summit and other issues related to sustainable agriculture, food security and nutrition.

Prior to joining IFAD in 2012, Zak worked with the UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service (UN-NGLS) and has also worked with large international NGOs and Foundations working in the sustainable development sphere as well as in the legislature of the State of Michigan.

Zak holds an MSc in Organizational Change Management from the New School for Public Engagement and BAs in Political Theory and International Relations from Michigan State University.

Albert Butare, Ph.D., is a former Minister of State for Infrastructure in the Republic of Rwanda and has over 20 years of energy, water, and communication experience in Africa. He is skilled in high-level public-sector policy, project development and implementation, engineering, and social and economic development. A Co-Chair of the Bonn-led Nexus process through Rio+20, Dr. Butare is currently CEO of Africa Energy Service Group (AESG) based in Kigali, Rwanda with a branch in Dar es Salaam. You can read more about AESG at the following URL: www.africaesg.com

Damaris Carnal recently joined the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment. She is Switzerland's Focal Point for the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and works as a Senior Policy Advisor. Prior to her current position, she was the Legal Counsellor at the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the WTO and EFTA (UNECE, UNCTAD, ITC) since September 2018. In that capacity, she was notably in charge of dispute settlement, trade, health, and all issues linked to trade and environmental sustainability/climate change.

She had joined the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) in 2007. She was notably the Legal Advisor and Counter-Terrorism Focal Point of the Swiss Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York from and the Head of the Section for International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Justice at the FDFA in Bern.

She holds a Master's degree in International Relations from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva and an LL.M. from the Geneva Academy of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law. She is an experienced international lawyer with extensive multilateral negotiations experience.

Felix Dodds is an Adjunct Professor at the University of North Carolina (UNC) and an Associate Fellow at the Tellus Institute. He was the co-director of the 2014 and 2018 Nexus Conference on Water, Food, Energy, and Climate. In 2019 he was a candidate for the Executive Director of the

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). He is the UNC lead Principal Investigator (PI) on the Belmont Forum grant on Disaster Rick Reduction and Resilience.

He has written or edited over 21 books. His most recent book – *Tomorrow's People and New Technologies: Changing How We Live Our Lives* – was published in 2021. His other books include the *Vienna Café Trilogy,* which chronicles sustainable development at the international level. He co-wrote 3 books: the first – *Only One Earth* – with Michael Strauss and Maurice Strong (the father of sustainable development), the second – *From Rio+20 to the New Development Agend*a – with Jorge Laguna Celis and Ambassador Liz Thompson, and the third – *Negotiating the Sustainable Development Goals* – with Ambassador David Donoghue and Jimena Leiva Roesch.

Felix was the Executive Director of Stakeholder Forum for a Sustainable Future from 1992 to 2012. He played a significant role in promoting multi-stakeholder dialogues at the United Nations and proposed to the UN General Assembly the introduction of stakeholder dialogue sessions at the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development. In 2011, Green Eco Services listed him as one of the 25 environmentalists ahead of their time. Also in 2011, he chaired the United Nations DPI 64th NGO conference – Sustainable Societies; Responsive Citizens – which put forward the first set of indicative Sustainable Development Goals. From 1997 to 2001 he co-chaired the UN Commission on Sustainable Development NGO Steering Committee.

Tim Grabiel is an experienced environmental lawyer and advocate based in Paris, France. He joined the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) in 2011, providing policy and legal advocacy on several issues at the European and international levels, including plastic pollution and short-lived climate pollutants. He has extensive experience working with governmental and non-governmental organizations on various environmental issues, which also include ozone protection, climate change, renewable energy, waste management, air quality, transportation, forests, and oceans. He taught international and trade law as an adjunct professor at Sciences Po in Le Havre, France. Prior to joining EIA, Tim worked on European Union (EU) legislation and litigation in Brussels and spent his career working in the United States, first serving as an Attorney at Make the Road by Walking in Brooklyn, New York and then as a Staff Attorney in the Environmental Justice Project at the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) in Los Angeles, California, where he litigated several successful cases against major polluters and government agencies, advanced municipal and state legislation, and represented low-income communities of colour. Tim is a law graduate of New York University (NYU) School of Law and received his undergraduate degree in Economics/International Area Studies from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). He is admitted to practice law in California, New York, England and Wales.

Oli Henman is the Global Coordinator of Action for Sustainable Development, where he leads the secretariat and coordinates global advocacy and engagement with multilateral bodies such as the UN and other international institutions. He also serves as one of the Organising Partners of the NGO Major Group linked to the High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. He has considerable experience working with civil society participation and governance in South America, Europe, and around the world. In his previous role at CIVICUS he led key advocacy on the SDG negotiations, including leading roles in the 'Sustainable Development 2015' and Action/2015 projects, and he contributed regularly to policy developments on citizen participation in the UN and EU decision-making. Prior to CIVICUS, he was Head of Partnerships & International at the National Council for Voluntary Organisations (UK); he was also a co-drafter of the Council of Europe's 'Code

of Good Practice on Civil Participation.' He is half-Brazilian and started his career working on participatory budgeting in the cities and rainforests of Brazil.

Sara Hamouda has over ten years of professional experience in the international cooperation and development field. She currently works for the African Union Secretariat for Peer Review Mechanism as an officer in charge of the Agenda 2063 Unit as well as SDGs and South-South Cooperation based in Johannesburg, South Africa.

She manages research projects as well as multi-lateral workshops and dialogue at the continental level to raise awareness, build capacities, and share experiences on the best practices for monitoring and evaluation of Agenda 2063 'Africa We Want' and Agenda 2063 for Sustainable Development and VNRs. She also handles the APRM collaboration with UNECA, UNDESA, and other organs. She previously worked at the Cabinet of the Minister of International Cooperation in Egypt as a Senior Economic Researcher in charge of cooperation with regional financial institutions as well as China for seven years. She also received a professional traineeship at the European Investment Bank (EIB) in Luxembourg from 2017 to 2018 where she performed policy analysis and research regarding the EIB's role outside of the EU, especially in the southern Mediterranean region on issues such as migration, donor relations, and economic resilience in neighboring countries.

Jessica Lobo is Global Goals Programme Manager for the UN Global Compact Network UK. Jessica joined the UN Global Compact Network UK in March 2020 and leads a growing team and a programme of activity to engage business, government, and stakeholders across the UK on the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). As the Global Goals Programme Manager, Jessica focuses on advocating the Goals, cultivating working groups with members of the Network, and hosting forums, webinars, and workshops to enable practical action, share knowledge across sectors, and inspire business ambition to deliver the SDGs.

Jessica is a member of the SDG Network Scotland Steering Group. She previously worked in sustainability roles in the Higher Education sector, leading on engagement and campaigns at The London School of Economics and Political Science and City, University of London. She has an LL.M. in Environmental Law from Queen Mary University of London and completed her bachelor studies at the University of Southampton and University of Oslo.

Asio Priscilla Margery is a District Planner in the Ngora District Local Government and has worked as a Planner since 2010. Generally, her areas of work are: resource allocation; formulating the District development strategies, plans, and budgets; preparing performance standards and indicators for the District; preparing the District Development Plans; facilitating the process of setting investment priorities for the District; monitoring and evaluating performance of the District Development Plans, programs, and projects; and appraising National and District Policy. During the 10 years of her work and since inception of Ngora District in 2010, Priscilla has been able to develop multiple District Development Plans, annual workplans, and budgets.

Priscilla has a B.S. in Population Studies, a Post Graduate Diploma in Project Planning and Management, and Post Graduate Diploma in Demography. She has completed all coursework and is now in the process of conducting dissertation research to earn a M.A. in Economic Policy Management of Makerere University Business School. She lives in Soroti, Uganda.

Ana Paula Fava de Moraes is Executive Coordinator of the State Commission for Sustainable Development Goals in the Office of the Governor. She has worked for 20 years in the Regional Government of São Paulo.

She was Head of International Affairs at the Secretariat for the Environment from 2008 to 2016 and Head of International Affairs of the Government of São Paulo from 2016 to 2018. At the 2015 Sustainable Development Summit in New York, São Paulo´s Regional Government was the official representative of all local governments. Since then, she has actively participated in accelerating SDGs in the Government of São Paulo. She coordinated the First Voluntary Local Review and the creation of São Paulo´s Regional Commission to the SDGs. As Executive Coordinator of the SDG Commission, she is currently coordinating the II Voluntary Local Review and fostering dialogue with Civil Society (academia, the private sector, and NGOs).

Ambassador Franz Xaver Perrez is the Head of the International Affairs Division at the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN) and the Swiss Ambassador for the Environment. He studied law in Bern, Paris, and New York and completed his studies with a doctoral thesis at the New York University School of Law on the topic of sovereignty as a principle of cooperation.

Before moving to the Federal Office for the environment, he was working for the Directorate of International Law at the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the WTO division of the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO).

As Switzerland's ambassador for the environment and chief negotiator for environmental issues – namely climate change, biodiversity, chemicals and waste – Franz Perrez led the Swiss delegation to the Rio+20 conference, served as President of the Basel Convention (COP 11 in 2013) and of the Rotterdam Convention (COP 8 in 2017), and facilitated the negotiations on mitigation of the Paris agreement.

Since 2008, Franz Perrez has served as a lecturer for international environmental law at the University of Bern School of Law. He was a panelist in the WTO tuna-dolphin dispute between Mexico and the United States (WT/DS381). He has been widely published in the area of international environmental law, international environmental governance, the relationship between trade, the environment, and public international law.

Sami Pirkkala is the Secretary General of Finland's National Commission on Sustainable Development and Chief Specialist on sustainability at the Prime Minister's Office. He is also a member of the Advisory Board of the European Sustainable Development Network ESDN. He has over 20 years of experience in public administration and policy planning. Prior to his current position, he worked for 15 years in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland in Helsinki, as well as in diplomatic postings in Madrid, Geneva, Athens, and London, and was part of the Finnish team in the UN negotiations for the Post-2015 Development Agenda. The National Commission on Sustainable Development is a multi-stakeholder forum that brings together key stakeholders of Finnish society. The Commission has been functioning since 1993 and is chaired by the Prime Minister.

Lea Ranalder is Project Manager and Analyst at the Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21) where she is responsible for research direction, project management, and community development of the REN21 Renewables in Cities Global Status Report, the first annual stock-take of the global energy transition at the city level. Previously, she was th Partnership Lead at

YES Europe which is a unique youth energy professional organization dedicated to cultivating a stronger community in Europe. She has also worked as a renewable energy consultant at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

A4SD	Action for Sustainable Development
AAAA	Addis Ababa Action Agenda
ACC	Administrative Committee on Coordination
ACF	Advocacy Coalitions Framework
ACCF	the Africa Climate Change Fund
AHEG	ad-hoc open-ended expert group on marine litter
AfDB	African Development Bank
ADC	Africa Data Consensus
AI	Artificial Intelligence
APF	Asia Pacific Forum
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ATPS	Africa Technology Policy Studies Network
AU	African Union
AWS	Alliance for Water Stewardship
BOGA	Beyond Oil and Gas Coalition
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity
CBDR	Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
CBHR	Corporate Benchmarking on Human Rights
CEB	Chief Executives Board
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CEPA	Committee of Experts on Public Administration
CGD	Citizen-Generated Data
CIVICUS	World Alliance for Citizen Participation
CoD	Community of Democracies
CHB	Complementary Housing Benefit
CJN	Climate Justice Now
CLEW	Climate Land Energy and Water
CO2	Carbon Dioxide

COP	Conference of the Parties
CR	Country review
CSA	Country self-assessment
CSD	Commission on Sustainable Development
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DCF	Development Cooperation Forum
DDP	District Development Plan
DEFRA	Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (UK)
ECESA	Executive Committee for Economic and Social Affairs
EEAC	Environmental and Sustainable Development Advisory Councils
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EMG	Environmental Management Group
ESG	Environmental, Social, and Governance
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FfD	Financing for Development
FSC	Forest Stewardship Council
GAVI	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
GBP	Green Bond Principles
GCMM	global carbon market mechanism
GEAPP	Global Energy Alliance for People and Planet
GFANZ	Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GN-NCSD	Global Network of National Councils for Sustainable Development and Similar Bodies
GPEDC	Global Partnership for Effective Cooperation
GPEI	Global Polio Eradication Initiative
GRI	Global Reporting Initiative
GSA	German Sustainability Award
GSDR	Global Sustainable Development Report

GWP	Global Water Partnership
HLPF	High Level Political Forum
HPC	Hybrid Parliamentary Committees
IACSD	Interagency Committee on Sustainable Development
IAEA	International Atomic for Energy Agency
IATF	Inter-Agency Task Force
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
ICSC	International Civil Society Centre
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IAEG-SDG	Inter-agency Expert Group on SDG Indicators
IEP	Institute of Economics and Peace
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IFLA	International Federation of Library Associations
IFSD	Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development
IGES	Institute for Global Environmental Strategies
IIED	Institute for International Environment and Development
IMF	International Money Fund
INC	intergovernmental negotiating committee
INDC	Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
IOT	input-output tables
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
JPol	Johannesburg Plan of Implementation
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
LDC	Least Developed Country
MDB	Multi-Lateral Development Banks
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MDG-EIAG	Millennium Development Goals Expert Inter-Agency Group
MGoS	Major Groups and other Stakeholders

MID	Maurice Ile Durable (Mauritius)
MOI	Means of Implementation
MSP	Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NHRI	National Human Rights Institutions
NCSD	National Councils for Sustainable Development
NCSD	National Commission on Sustainable Development
NDCs	National Determined Contributions
NFFT	National Council for Sustainable Development (Hungary)
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NPEAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NPoAs	National Plans of Action
NSDS	National Sustainable Development Strategies
NSO	National Statistical Offices
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OI	Open Institute Kenya
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
ORU-Fogar	United Regions Organization
OWG	Open Working Group
PA21	Philippine Agenda 21
PDP	Philippine Development Plan
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
PrepCom	Preparatory Committee
PRI	United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment
PPP	Public Private Partnerships
QCPR	Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review
REEP	Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership

RNE	German Council for Sustainable Development
RTI	Right to Information
SAICM	Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management
SAIIA	The South African Institute of International Affairs
SAP	Strategy and Action Plan
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SEA	Social Emergency Aid
SEADE	São Paulo State Statistical Data System Foundation
SBP	Social Bond Principles
SDS	Sustainable Development Strategy
SDplanNet	Sustainable Development Planning Network
SDTF	Sustainable Development Transition Forum
SEB	Skandinaviska Enskila Banken
SF	Stakeholder Forum
SHaSA	Strategy for the Harmonization of Statistics
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Resource-Based, With Time Based Deliverables
SSI	Sustainable Stock Exchanges
TAI	The Access Initiative
UCLG	United Cities and Local Governments
UN	United Nations
UNCAS	United Nations Convention Against Corruption
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNEA	United Nations Environment Assembly
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UN ECLAC	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

UNDPI	United Nations Department of Public Information
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEA	United Nations Environment Assembly
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNESCO-IPDC	UNESCO International Programme for Development Communication
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNEP-FI	United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UKSSD	UK Stakeholders for Sustainable Development
USP	University of São Paulo
VI	Voluntary Initiative
VLR	Voluntary Local Review
VNR	Voluntary National Reviews
WB	World Bank
WBA	World Benchmarking Alliance
WHO	World Health Organization
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
WTO	World Trade Organization

Chapter 1

São Paulo's Step-By-Step to Sustainable Development Governance

Ana Paula Fava de Moraes, Executive Coordinator of São Paulo's Regional SDG Commission

In September 2015, the United Nations launched the ambitious 2030 Agenda during the Sustainable Development Summit with the aim of measuring the world population's quality of life. On this occasion, the State of São Paulo was the official voice of all subnational governments in the world which highlighted the strength of the region. This historic event brought the government an immediate understanding of the importance of assuming the commitment to implement the 2030 Agenda in São Paulo and, therefore, to implement actions for sustainable development governance.

Launching of the 2030 Agenda; São Paulo Region, the voice of Subnational Governments; Sustainable Development Summit September 2015, United Nations, New York City

In her speech, which gave voice to local governments around the world, Patrícia Iglecias, then State Secretary for the Environment, said:

"We represent subnational and local governments, which are those closest to their citizens. Through local and subnational networks such as ICLEI, Regions4, and UCLG, we have been engaged for some time in international discussions… Finally, I emphasize the importance of the involvement of local governments, together with countries, to support the implementation of this ambitious Agenda and I am proud to say that the Government of São Paulo has taken its first step by signing a Resolution to plan our subnational implementation strategy."

Since then, the government has acted uninterruptedly to raise awareness among governmental authorities and agents in monitoring data and institutionalizing the 2030 Agenda through legal instruments and actions to promote sustainable development in all its three dimensions – social, environmental, and economic – and thereby making it a State Agenda independent of the current administration.

Legal Instruments

Office of the Chief of Staff/Department of the Environment/Department of Social Development Joint Resolution No. 1 of September 21, 2015:

- Decree No. 62.063 of June 27, 2016 – Establishes the Interdepartmental Working Group (GTI) to implement the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) approved at the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit, held at the United Nations (UN) headquarters on September 25-27, 2015, in the State of São Paulo.

Ruling of the Secretary of the Office of the Chief of Staff of July 25, 2016, which appoints the Special Adviser for International Affairs of the Office of the Chief of Staff as coordinator of the Interdepartmental Working Group:

- Decree No. 63.792 of November 9, 2018 – Establishes the São Paulo State Sustainable Development Goals Commission;
- Decree No. 64.124 of March 8, 2019 – Establishes rules on the preparation of the 2020-2023 Multi-Year Plan;
- Decree No. 64.148 of March 19, 2019 – Reorganizes the São Paulo State Sustainable Development Goals Commission established by Decree No. 63.792 of November 9, 2018;

CC [Office of the Chief of Staff]/SDE [Department of Economic Development] Joint Resolution No. 1 of June 26, 2019 – Establishes provisions on the appointment of members of the São Paulo State Sustainable Development Goals Commission.

History

Historically the State of São Paulo has either participated or followed the discussions of the main international UN Conferences since Stockholm (1972) both as a member of subnational networks – such as The Climate Group, Regions4, and ICLEI – and through invitations directly addressed to CETESB, the State of São Paulo's environmental agency. Its participation has been mainly in the Climate Change and the Biodiversity Conferences of the Parties (COPs) as well as in UN-HABITAT to present initiatives in its capacity as a subnational government (i.e. "State Program on Protecting the Ozone Layer" (PROZONESP, 1995); State Program on Global Climate Change (PROCLIMA, 1995); "State Policy on Climate Change" (PEMC, 2009) and "Race to Zero" (2021)). Although Parties (countries) are the negotiators of international agreements, new actors – subnational governments, the private sector, academia, and NGOs – have claimed opportunities for increased participation in international decisions since the 1990s.[1] In this context, São Paulo's government has emerged in this wave of new international governance, playing a larger role in multilateralism – at COP 3 in Kyoto (1997), COP 10 in Nagoya (2010), Rio+20 in Rio de Janeiro (2012), COP 21 in Paris (2015), among others – and sharing its initiatives with peers worldwide.

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[1] ONUKI, Janina and AGOPYAN, Kelly, Organizações e Regimes Internacionais [Organizations and International Regimes, 2021; ONUKI, Janina and OLIVEIRA, Amâncio Jorge, Paradiplomacia e Relações Internacionais [Paradiplomacy and International Relations],(2007).

The historical constrution of Suistanable Development

Stockholm Conference (1972) "Environment and Development" Establishment of UNEP	**Brundtland Report (1987)** Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future	**21 Agenda (Rio 92)** Sustainable Development and how to reverse the process of environmental degradation on a global scale.
COPs (since 1995) Climate Change Biodiversity	**Rio+20, (2012)** "The Future We Want"	**17 Sustainable Development Goals 2030 AGENDA**

Actions

Alongside the legal instruments, the former Special Advisory Office for International Affairs within the Office of the Chief of Staff – the highest agency of the Government of the State of São Paulo for international issues until 2018 – took, between 2015 and 2018, the first actions to discuss the topic of sustainable development. The Office hosted awareness workshops to strengthen dialogue among different governmental levels and external actors. The Office also published the *Human Rights Agenda* (www.guiadoimigrante.sp.gov.br) devoted to welcoming the wave of immigrants, mainly from Venezuela, who arrived in São Paulo and *O Mundo Que Queremos [The World We Want]* to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Human Rights Declaration. While these were isolated public policies, they were fundamental in the process of implementing the 2030 Agenda in the government.

OBJETIVOS DE DESENVOLVIMENTO SUSTENTÁVEL   SÃO PAULO GOVERNO DO ESTADO

2030 Agenda's Workshop

SP's Government Headquarters "Palácio dos Bandeirantes" (2017)

Bottom right picture from left to right – Ana Paula Fava, Head of International Affairs; Mauricio de Sousa, most famous Brazilian cartoonist and Prof Jose Goldemberg, winner of the Blue Planet Prize in 2008.

Workshop at Palácio dos Bandeirantes, 2017

Along with the actions mentioned above, the State produced the *I São Paulo State SDGs Monitoring Report*. Launched in 2019, the report was prepared by government experts from the Finance, Planning, International Affairs departments in partnership with the São Paulo State Statistical Data System Foundation (SEADE) and the São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP). It was an extremely important publication as it was a first for the government and connected the 2016-2019 Multi-Year Plan to the 2030 Agenda. It categorized some of the government's programs within the context of the SDGs. Shortly thereafter, this publication was recognized by the United Nations as the *I Voluntary Local Review of the State of São Paulo,* the official commitment of the Government of São Paulo in implementing the 2030 Agenda. For more details, please visit https://sdgs.un.org/topics/voluntary-local-reviews, www.seade.gov.br, and www.fapesp.br.

The São Paulo Regional Commission to the SDGs was also created through Decree No. 63.792 in 2018.

The Special Advisory Office for International Affairs, linked to the Office of the Chief of Staff, was extinguished in 2019. A Department of International Affairs was created, although the 2030 Agenda remained at the Office of the Chief of Staff, due to its mandate within the Government to implement the 2030 Agenda. That same year, the Office of the Chief of Staff became the chair of the Commission and the Department of Economic Development became its Executive Office.

SDG Commission Structure

The SDG Commission consists of one sitting member and one alternate member from each of the 24 state departments, certain government agencies, and members of organized civil society. It was designed based on the UN 5Ps (People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace, and Partnerships). Its decision-making body is a Technical Support Group formed by state government members with a technical profile: the State Data Analysis System Foundation (SEADE); the Environmental Company (CETESB); the Department of Finance and Planning (SEFAZ); the Institute of Technology Research (IPT); the Sanitation Company (SABESP); and the Department of Infrastructure and the Environment (SIMA).

Partnerships

The government departments and agencies were allocated into four subgroups: People, Planet, Prosperity, and Peace to more effectively focus on their priority themes. Although Partnerships was not allocated as a subgroup due to its complexity in terms of external actors, I will describe some of its actions later in this chapter.

Structure of São Paulo's Regional SDG Commission

PEOPLE

We are determined to end poverty and hunger

- Department of Social Development
- Department for the Rights of Disabled Persons
- Department of Education
- Department of Sports
- Department of Health
- Department of Culture and Creative Economy
- São Paulo Social Fund
- Institute of Technological Researches

PLANET

We are determined to protect the planet from degradation

- Department of Infrastructure and the Environment
- SABESP (Sanitation Company)
- CETESB (Environmental Company)
- Department of Agriculture
- Office of the Military Chief of Staff and Civil Defense
- Institute of Technological Researches

PROSPERITY

We are determined to ensure that all human beings can enjoy prosperous and fulfilling lives

- Department of Economic Development
- Department of Regional Development
- Department of Tourism
- Department of Housing
- Department of Logistics and Transportation
- Department of Metropolitan Transportation
- Department of International Relations
- Department of Finance and Planning
- Institute of Technology Research
- DesenvolveSP (Regional Bank)

PEACE

We are determined to foster peaceful, just and inclusive societies

- Department of Justice and Citizenship
- Department of Law Enforcement
- Department of Corrections Office of the General Counsel for the State
- Institute of Technological Researches

Technical Support Group

Environment Agency

Financing and Planning

Technological and Research Institute

Sanitation Agency

Data System Foundation

Infrastructure and Environment

The starting point for the SDG Commission in 2019 was to establish how the government's priority programs are related to government planning instruments (i.e., the Multi-Year and Targets Plan) and goals linked to the UN global goals through a specific methodology created for this purpose. Such work was the cornerstone for the preparation of the *II São Paulo State SDGs Monitoring Report,* which was also defined by UN as the *II Voluntary Local Review (UN) of the State of São Paulo.*

The preparation of the II Report (2020 – 2021) represented major progress in the dissemination and implementation of the 2030 Agenda in the government because, unlike the I Report, it was prepared after the creation of the SDG Commission and had the participation of all SDG Commission member institutions actively involved (24 state departments and several agencies). Therefore, it demonstrates the increased engagement of government agents through the awareness and training work developed by the SDG Commission, particularly since 2019, when the State SDG Commission – established in November 2018 and redesigned in March 2019 – effectively began to operate in practice. The II report focused on communicating programs and public policies that the State of São Paulo has been implementing that contribute to advancing the 2030 Agenda in its territory.

Thus, the report included 94 different initiatives and programs selected by the 24 members of the SDG Commission, distributed among the 5 Ps: People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace, and Partnerships.

Labels	Distinct Count of PROGRAM ID
Partnerships	4
Peace	15
People	30
Planet	17
Prosperity	28
Total	**94**

These 94 initiatives support 68 of the 169 SDG targets (40% of the total) across all the 17 Goals, which represents 40% of all goals.

Partnerships and Means of Implementation

The Partnerships and Means of Implementation theme is a cross-cutting topic that allows for dialogue between all government entities and civil society (the private sector, academia, and the nonprofit sector).

Although "Partnerships" is not a Thematic Chamber itself, it does not mean the subject is being neglected. On the contrary, several programs are being developed by the Government together with the private and nonprofit sectors. These are public-private partnerships (PPPs), concessions, management contracts, agreements, and other types of partnerships established in favor of promoting sustainable development.

Moreover, the SDG Commission and its civil society members are working together to develop joint projects with the School of Government of the State of São Paulo (EGESP) in the preparation of an SDG Training Program for government agents with the University of São Paulo (USP). These projects include a report to better understand the impacts of microcredits on the Sustainable Development of São Paulo's territory and a study with the University of São Paulo (USP) and UN Women focusing on a diagnosis of women's rights based on existing governmental policy.

Challenges

For the years 2020-2030, the UN launched the "Decade of Action." It is a crucial period for the success of SDGs and a short time to reach an extensive and ambitious set of Goals and Targets. Furthermore, the world is facing new global challenges that make the 2030 Agenda as difficult as it is necessary.

The Brazilian Federal government created the National Sustainable Development Goals Commission (CNSDG) as a governance body to internalize, disseminate, and provide transparency to the process of implementation of the 2030 Agenda in Brazil through Decree No. 8.892 of October 27, 2016. Between 2016 and 2018, representatives of the National Office for Social Articulation of the Presidency of the Republic participated heavily and supported the work of the Government of São Paulo in the implementation actions of the State SDG Commission. With the enactment of Decree No. 9.759 of April 11, 2019, the CNSDG was extinguished and the dialogue with state governments has not resumed so far.

During the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-present), there have been countless health, social, and economic challenges . With a focus on science and research institutions, the São Paulo State Government started its continuing struggle for vaccines and promoting public health through its programs to fight the pandemic. This strategy asked for specific actions which led to unique solutions from regional governments and a growing political crisis between São Paulo State and the Federal Government as both entities have chosen a different path. This is an emblematic case of a subnational government in complete dissonance with its national government.

Since 2019, the topic of sustainable development governance has had significant political support from the Office of the Chief of Staff of the São Paulo Government, which is in charge of the internal government strategy for sustainable development and coordinating sustainable development strategy between the executive and legislative branches. This coordination was essential for the State SDG Commission to begin its work and disseminate it among government agents. The integration of different government institutions and the preparation of reports that link government actions to planning instruments and the SDGs gave impetus to this topic in the state administration.

The Office of the Chief of Staff, which chairs the SDG Commission, plays the role of promoting synergies between the agencies so that the state administration can draw up joint strategies for implementing the SDGs. The Office of the Chief of Staff is also working to insert the SDGs in other strategic fronts of action of the state government.

This effort takes the form of communication and transparency actions for society, as well as inserting the SDGs as a reference framework for state plans and industry-specific public policies and for directing parliamentary amendments.

Below are some highlights of the activity of the Office of the Chief of Staff to promote the 2030 Agenda:

- Three editions of the *Impact of the Actions by the Government of the State of São Paulo to fight COVID-19 on SDGs* report, in partnership with the Department of International Affairs;
- *10 Years of the São Paulo Sports Incentive Law* report – The contribution of sports to the Sustainable Development of the State of São Paulo, in partnership with the Department of Sports;
- *Report on the Impacts of the Novo Rio Pinheiros Program on the Sustainable Development Goals* – in partnership with the Department of Infrastructure and the Environment and with Companhia de Saneamento Básico do Estado de São Paulo (Sabesp);
- *Survey on the Participation of Women in Senior Positions in the Government*;
- *Report on Actions, Projects, and Good Social Practices of institutions linked to the Government*;
- Categorization of parliamentary amendments within the SDG framework; and
- Launch of the drawing competition *The 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals*. This initiative was carried out in 2020 by the Government of the State of São Paulo to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the UN and is the result of a partnership between the Office of the Chief of Staff and the Departments of Education, International Affairs, and Government. The Palaces Artistic and Cultural Collection also participated in the organization and held a virtual exhibition of the 20 winning drawings, available at http://www.acervo.sp.gov.br/concurso/index.html.

Such actions underscore the commitment of the Government of the State of São Paulo to implement and accelerate the 2030 Agenda in São Paulo territory and localizing the SDGs, thereby initiating a new governance process.

Nevertheless, the transition to a Sustainable Development Governance framework faced some difficulties which are worth mentioning. The SDG Commission faced three major challenges: 1) internal, 2) external, and 3) global.

The first major challenge (internal) was to engage the member representatives of the 24 state departments and some agencies in a new and complex Agenda. For this purpose, some experts were invited to talk about the topic and interactive workshops were developed to engage them in each step of the preparation of the II Report. For this purpose, it was necessary to create a work methodology that could be compared to the magnifying glass effect – from a micro to a macro overview and from specific topics to global regional interests. This process contributed to achieving the expected result: the preparation of a single, jointly drafted document that could be shared and assist other subnational governments worldwide.

The second major challenge (external) was to try to engage the members of civil society who are part of the SDG Commission (i.e., the private sector and nonprofit organizations) in a dialogue with the government of São Paulo.

The third challenge (global) was the COVID-19 pandemic, which required governments worldwide to take a series of emergency measures and carry out a review of priority programs and actions to address a health crisis without precedent. The Government of the State of São Paulo relied on science and the guidelines of the World Health Organization (WHO), always focusing on prioritizing life. It invested heavily in technology, research, partnerships, and human resources for the development of the CORONAVAC vaccine by the Butantan Institute (www.butantan.gov.br), which is not only meeting the immunization needs of the population of the State of São Paulo but also of Brazil as a whole. The world is still dealing with the pandemic and researchers are observing and trying to understand the impacts of this crisis on international relations.

The São Paulo Regional SDG Commission gradually became a space for dialogue among its members, especially at a technical level. It allows for a holistic understanding of how each specific sector interacts and contributes to advancing sustainable development within the Government of the State of São Paulo and this has a cascade effect on progress on sustainable development across the entirety of Brazil and around the world.

Although the 2030 Agenda is not a binding commitment signed by UN member countries, including Brazil, it is known that this is an Agenda currently being discussed by most governments and by all sectors of society. Implementing it means not only bringing benefits to local society, but also to the government itself in terms of respectability, attracting investment, and improving the quality of life of its population.

Thus, the Subnational Government of the State of São Paulo – with a population of nearly 46 million people, 1/3 of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country, strong industrialization, significant investments in infrastructure, and excellence in research, universities, and professional training – assumed this voluntary commitment during the UN Sustainable Development Summit in 2015, which places us on the list of major players on the international stage. Through participation in international discussion forums and subnational government networks, it enhances its possibilities for exchanging experiences and expanding partnerships. After all, multilateral organizations and international investors favor governments that are committed to the main axes of the 2030 Agenda (i.e., social, economic, and environmental). Therefore, the government is in constant dialogue with other governments equally committed to major global issues (i.e., climate change, biodiversity, and sustainable development) and shares its experiences with other subnational and national entities.

We can therefore affirm that if today the State of São Paulo has sustainable development as one of its main pillars in the preparation of its public policies, this is largely due to the monitoring and commitments undertaken by the government vis-à-vis these key international agreements and thee 2030 Agenda. This engagement has allowed us to advance towards governance that not only respects the environment, but also offers prosperity in an inclusive way to our entire population. The São Paulo State supports Sustainable Development and its actions reinforce its slogan: "São Paulo: A State of Respect."

Chapter 2

Taking CEPA Principles for Effective Governance of SDGs into Actions in Africa

By Sara Hamouda, officer in charge of the Agenda 2063/SDGs unit at the African Peer Review Mechanism in Johannesburg, South Africa

Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development are cornerstones of Africa's regional integrational and sustainable future. Both agendas emphasize governance as imperative for the SDGs delivery and promoting Africa's institutional and human capabilities. SDG 16 which calls for effective, strong, and efficient institutions and peaceful societies encounters Aspiration 3 of Agenda 2063 – "An Africa of Good Governance, Democracy, Respect for Human Rights."

In this context, the United Nations Committee of Experts on Public Administration (CEPA) came up with the principles known as the UNCEPA principles for effective governance of SDGs, which identified sixty-two strategies to assist countries in domestication and monitoring of both agendas. Therefore, successful planning and implementation depend on how a politically mobilising philosophy and socially effective and desirable development plan embrace these engagement tools as lenses through which these two agendas are understood and addressed at all society levels.

The African Peer Review Mechanism initiated the development of a baseline study on CEPA principles in Africa to understand the extent of knowledge, awareness, and implementation of CEPA principles at the national level amongst 17 African countries. This chapter provides a brief insight on the rationale of this study, key findings, and recommendations. It also highlights best practices and persistent challenges in some African countries to promote CEPA principles and ensure whole of society approach in sustainable development policymaking and implementation.

Background on CEPA study, Methodology, and Geographical Scope

Under the expanded mandate of the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the continental mechanism has a dual mandate of monitoring and evaluating Agenda 2063 and the United Nations SDGs, particularly SDG 16 – effective, strong, and efficient institutions and peaceful societies – which encounters Aspirations 3 and 4 of Agenda 2063: An Africa of Good Governance, Democracy, Respect for Human Rights, Justice and the Rule of Law and A Peaceful and Secure Africa, respectively. With all the persistent challenges to report on both agendas across the continent and in light of the APRM eagerness to assist the African Union (AU) Member States to accelerate the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063, the APRM took the lead to conduct this baseline study on CEPA principles of effective governance of SDGs aligned with Agenda 2063.

The decision to pursue APRM baseline study on the said principles derives from the APRM Africa Regional Workshop's recommendations on Effective Governance for Sustainable Development, which was held from October 30th to November 1st, 2019 in Pretoria, South Africa. As an outcome of this workshop, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) resolved to undertake a baseline study on the status of

implementation of the eleven (11) UN Committee of Experts on Public Administration (CEPA) principles of effective governance for sustainable development in Africa.

The study's significance is assured with the current global health crisis created by COVID-19. A health crisis on a global scale has transformed into an economic, social, and political challenge for which the world is seeking answers to resolve the menacing pandemic, which is now over two years old in Africa. Some critical pointers toward what questions to ask derive from Agenda 2063 and the UN SDGs' programmes. However, this would not have been brought into sharper focus without the strategic and practical import and application of the UNCEPA Principles.

The baseline study on awareness, knowledge, and understanding of the UNCEPA principles was envisaged in a period that precedes COVID-19. But how should the world approach and address a COVID-19 and post-COVID-19 environment from a good governance perspective? How will Agenda 2063 and the SDGs benefit from the serendipitous alignment between the UNCEPA principles study and these two agendas?

Methodology and Geographical Scope – Country Selection and Criteria

A total of thirteen (13) countries were carefully selected based on some criteria that included: regional balance amongst AU Member States; active engagement in the APRM review process; progress on reporting on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063; and participation in the CEPA activities (Table 1).

Table 1: Summary of the Features of the Thirteen Proposed Countries per Region for the APRM - UN CEPA Baseline Study

Item	Country	Progress on SDG 2030/Agenda 2063 reporting
East Africa		
	Republic of Kenya	The VNR was submitted twice (2018 and 2020). In the Republic of Kenya, the CEPA principles are followed at the national and county level where specific functions are performed at those specific levels. In this regard, policies are formulated and translated into short-, medium-, and long-term plans (i.e., the five (5) year development plan based on Kenya's Vision 2030). By law, all stakeholders must participate before the medium-term plan is accepted. The first- and second-generation reviews conducted by the APRM in Kenya provided solutions to some challenges and reflect a level of independence from the government. These reviews indicated the state of governance in Kenya, including reviews at the sub-national level with recommendations to be implemented within five (5) years.

	Republic of Rwanda	The first VNR was submitted in 2019. APRM established a partnership with the SDGC/A in Kigali to promote VNRs follow up at the regional level.
	Republic of Uganda	The first VNR was submitted in 2019 and the second was submitted for the HLPF in July 2021. The APRM Country Review was conducted twice. The Republic of Uganda provides an excellent example from the Continent in reporting on SDGs, especially SDG 16. The Republic of Uganda is currently mainstreaming SDGs utilizing existing instruments related to their NDPs towards implementing and achieving the SDGs. Uganda underwent a VNR for the second time in 2020, taking the CEPA principles into consideration.
North Africa		
	Arab Republic of Egypt	The VNR was submitted three times. The APRM Country Review has been completed. The Arab Republic of Egypt, as part of its statistical institution, has established a national high-level coordinating body tailored explicitly towards achieving the SDGs and Agenda 2063 Aspirations. In this case, the prioritization of government interventions is based on data.
	Republic of Tunisia	The first VNR was submitted in 2019 and the second was submitted in 2021. The country reported twice on the SASHA tool for peace, governance, and development.
	Republic of Sudan	The first VNR was submitted in 2018. The APRM governance gap analysis report was produced in December 2020. Special attention is given to Sudan after the regime change in 2019.
Southern Africa		
	Republic of Botswana	The first VNR was submitted. Botswana acceded to the APRM in 2019 and has shown solid progress on good governance over the last three decades.
	Kingdom of Lesotho	The first VNR was submitted. The APRM Country Review has been completed.
	Republic of Mauritius	The first VNR was submitted. The APRM Country Review has been completed and Mauritius has actively engaged in APRM networks (i.e., corporate governance and SDGs regional workshops).
	Republic of South Africa	The first VNR was submitted in 2019 and second was submitted in 2021. The APRM Country Review has been completed. The 2nd generation Country Review was conducted in 2021.

		Resilient model of mitigating shocks i.e., COVID-19 South Africa is developing a district-based model that brings local governments together to ensure public and private sector development towards a cohesive approach at the district level. The main challenge of this model has been to create robust institutions that can connect.
West Africa		
	Republic of Ghana	The first VNR was submitted. Ghana has mobilized civil society around SDG 16 through the Ghana Civil Society Platform that comprises hundreds of civil society organisations. Collaboration has taken place between all actors who are participating in the implementation of SDGs. The people of Ghana have co-published with civil society a shadow report on the VNRs titled *Progress on SDGs, Telling the Ghanaian Story through the Lens of Citizens,* a useful tool that may be replicated elsewhere.
	Republic of Senegal	The first VNR was submitted in 2019. The APRM Country Review has been completed. Senegal incorporated APRM National Plan of Action into its National Development Plan.
	Federal Republic of Nigeria	The VNR was submitted in 2020 and current national planning alignment with SDGs indicators is promoted at the national level. Nigeria has actively engaged in the APRM process.

The study followed a mixture of methods; first, a desk and exploratory review on implementing CEPA principles and strategies in selected African countries as well as progress of SDGs 2030 and AU 2063; second, a survey questionnaire testing awareness, knowledge, understanding, and implementation of the principles in the context of COVID-19 along with side consultations among national executives. The results of the survey are divided into four areas:

1) respondents' demographics;

2) their level of awareness, knowledge, and understanding of the principles;

3) application of the UNCEPA principles in policy work;

4) COVID-19 impact on the 62 CEPA strategies amongst the governments various protective and recovery measures and emerging opportunities.

The APRM got responses from the following thirteen (13) countries: Egypt, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, South Africa, Senegal, Tunisia, and Uganda.

Understanding CEPA Principles

The UNCEPA principles revamp societal, political, and economic strategies and guidelines for the SDGs' effective governance. It frames the long-term global goals of sustainability along with eleven principles that address three key contexts. The first is the context of **effectiveness,** and this is described and expatiated upon by three areas of *competence, sound policymaking, and collaboration.* The second is about **accountability.** The descriptors of this aspect are *integrity, transparency, and independent oversight.* Finally, the third is the context of **inclusiveness,** which includes leaving no one behind, non-discrimination, participation, subsidiarity, and integrational equity. Given the complex and interlinked nature of SDGs and Agenda 2063 aspirations, it is incredibly challenging to have a clear picture of the understanding, implementation, and knowledge of citizens and even experts on CEPA principles and how they are incorporated at the national level.

Effectiveness	Accountability	Inclusiveness
• Competence • Sound policy making • Collaboration	• Integrity • Transparency • Independent oversight	• Leaving no one behind • Non-discrimination • Participation • Subsidiarity • Integrational equity

Figure 1 CEPA Principles for Effective Governance of Sustainable Development Goals (Source: UN CEPA, 2018)

To explore this complexity, UNCEPA for each set of principles has come up with 62 commonly used strategies based on their amenability to deploy for explicating and addressing complexities in public administration settings. In this regard, the principles are being tested in the context of the APRM. Further, a selected number of African countries have been willingly active in figuring out whether national executives and practitioners can understand these principles. The purpose is to deploy appropriate ways to ensure that the officers in charge are empowered to deploy these tools to achieve service effectiveness through accountability and inclusiveness in public administration.

Principle	*Commonly used strategies*

Effectiveness

Competence	To perform their functions effectively, institutions are to have sufficient expertise, resources and tools to deal	• Promotion of a professional public sector workforce

	adequately with the mandates under their authority	• Strategic human resources management • Leadership development and training of civil servants • Performance management • Results-based management • Financial management and control • Efficient and fair revenue administration • Investment in e-government
Sound policymaking	To achieve their intended results, public policies are to be coherent with one another and founded on true or well-established grounds, in full accordance with fact, reason, and good sense	• Strategic planning and foresight • Regulatory impact analysis • Promotion of coherent policymaking • Strengthening national statistical systems • Monitoring and evaluation systems • Science-policy interface • Risk management frameworks • Data sharing
Collaboration	To address problems of common interest, institutions at all levels of government and in all sectors should work together and jointly with non-State actors towards the same end, purpose, and effect	• Centre of government coordination under the Head of State or Government • Collaboration, coordination, integration and dialogue across levels of government and functional areas • Raising awareness of the SDGs • Network-based governance • Multi-stakeholder partnerships

Accountability

Integrity	To serve in the public interest, civil servants are to discharge their official duties honestly, fairly, and in a manner consistent with soundness of moral principles	• Promotion of anti-corruption policies, practices, and bodies • Codes of conduct for public officials • Competitive public procurement • Elimination of bribery and trading in influence • Conflict of interest policies • Whistle-blower protection • Provision of adequate remuneration and equitable pay scales for public servants
Transparency	To ensure accountability and enable public scrutiny, institutions are to be open and candid in the execution of their functions and promote access to information, subject only to the specific and limited exceptions as are provided by law	• Proactive disclosure of information • Budget transparency • Open government data • Registries of beneficial ownership • Lobby registries
Independent oversight	To retain trust in government, oversight agencies are to act according to strictly professional considerations and apart from and unaffected by others	• Promotion of the independence of regulatory agencies • Arrangements for review of administrative decisions by courts or other bodies • Independent audit • Respect for legality

Inclusiveness

Leaving no one behind	To ensure that all human beings can fulfil their potential in dignity and equality, public policies are to take into account the needs and aspirations of all segments of society,	• Promotion of equitable fiscal and monetary policy • Promotion of social equity • Data disaggregation

	including the poorest and most vulnerable and those subject to discrimination	• Systematic follow-up and review
Non-discrimination	To respect, protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, access to public service is to be provided on general terms of equality, without distinction of any kind as to race, colour, gender, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, disability, or other status	• Promotion of public sector workforce diversity • Prohibition of discrimination in public service delivery • Multilingual service delivery • Accessibility standards • Cultural audit of institutions • Universal birth registration • Gender-responsive budgeting
Participation	To have an effective State, all significant political groups should be actively involved in matters that directly affect them and have a chance to influence policy	• Free and fair elections • Regulatory process of public consultation • Multi-stakeholder forums • Participatory budgeting • Community-driven development
Subsidiarity	To promote government that is responsive to the needs and aspirations of all people, central authorities should perform only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at a more intermediate or local level	• Fiscal federalism • Strengthening urban governance • Strengthening municipal finance and local finance systems • Enhancement of local capacity for prevention, adaptation and mitigation of external shocks • Multilevel governance
Intergenerational equity	To promote prosperity and quality of life for all, institutions should construct administrative acts that balance the short-term needs of today's generation with the longer-	• Sustainable development impact assessment • Long-term public debt management

| term needs of future generations | • Long-term territorial planning and spatial development |
| | • Ecosystem management |

APRM Instrument to Assess Level of Awareness, Implementation of CEPA Principles in Africa, and Impact of COVID-19

The APRM-CEPA assessment tool was developed under the auspices of the APRM continental Secretariat and shared with national experts from selected African countries for their feedback. Various regional partners including SDGs centre for Africa, African Governance Architecture, and UN ECA focal points were engaged in designing CEPA survey. Besides the survey instrument, a desktop analysis of various documents, including reports, policy statements, and outcome reports of APRM activities were consulted to develop our analysis on the implementation of CEPA principles in Africa.

The survey and desktop study covered North, East, West, and Southern Africa. The data was collected from August to November 2020 from experts of national governments, civil society, and business groups. Thirteen African countries were covered in the desktop study: Egypt, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, Mauritius, Lesotho, Botswana, and South Africa. With its new mandate, the APRM must monitor the implementation of SDGs as well as Agenda 2063.

Findings from APRM Study and COVID-19 Impact on the Principles

The Report recognizes the significance of the UNCEPA principles in the context of the expanded mandate of the APRM, namely of monitoring and evaluating the implementation of Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want and the UN SDGs Agenda 2030. The principles come in at the right time and should empower the APRM in executing its task.

CEPA principles assures the solid and positive linkages between the institution-building objectives of the 2030 Agenda and all of the SDGs. For example, the ability to explore innovative sources of financing, manage public-private partnerships, adopt new approaches to biodiversity preservation, improve wastewater treatment, strengthen social protection, and expand access to health care all require adequate capacity institutions.

In the context of COVID-19, the UNCEPA principles offer essential recommendations, including strengthening institutions' competence by leveraging digital government calls for greatly accelerated action to address digital divides within and across countries. The impact of digital government on achieving the goals, in general, is determined by social and economic circumstances, for example, relating to the learning environment or access to water and sanitation in combating disease. Also, artificial intelligence and other technologies are expected to significantly shift and disrupt labour markets, which may have important implications for occupational groups involved in public service delivery. Investment in digital government and related infrastructure, knowledge, and capabilities should thus be considered within the context of national sustainable development strategies and priorities.

The Global SDG Index 2020 infers that Africa continues to make marginal progress on SDGs with the score increasing by a point annually. However, no African country is in the top 55 countries. North Africa is the best-performing region on average. The best-ranked Algeria only appears 56th with a score of 72.3, meaning that the country respectively performs on average 72.3% of the way to the best possible outcome across the 17 SDGs. The best possible outcome is 100%. The Sub-Saharan Africa average score is lower at 53.1, and the region is stagnating towards SDG 2030 targets on goals (1-7), 11, 16, and 17.

Performance gaps remain wide-ranging, especially on poverty and education. A glance at SDG 16 shows that reporting on the goal is improving compared to the last three years. Yet, African countries face various critical statistical gaps to capture most of the indicators pertinent to this goal. Further, institutional aspects of SDG 16 – mainly inclusiveness, effectiveness, and government integrity – are challenged by the pandemic effects beginning in 2020.

SDGs Financing in Africa in the context of COVID-19 is another challenge listed by many African countries. The decline of Official Development Assistance (ODA), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and remittances to the continent will derail most SDGs' overall progress. Thus, CEPA principles and its strategies – which include tackling Africa's long-lasting financial fatigues (i.e., external debt and illicit financial flows) – shall be necessarily addressed.

The pandemic has underscored the central role of effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels that are capable of coping with complex and urgent governance challenges. This includes local authorities and communities working in partnership with civil society and the private sector in crisis response and ongoing contextualized implementation of the SDGs.

Awareness, Understanding and Implementation of CEPA Principles

The level of awareness and knowledge of CEPA principles varies across the continent amongst national executives. The discrepancy from awareness, knowledge, and understanding of the principles is severely vast. The following figure shows the extent of awareness amongst respondents.


Figure 2: Level of Awareness of CEPA principles amongst African experts (source: APRM 2021)

Therefore, raising awareness on CEPA principles among national experts concerned about the SDGs domestication and implementation is necessary. Out of the twenty-six experts and key informants who responded to the questionnaire, five were unable to venture an opinion on awareness of UNCEPA principles; this begs the question of how non-expert practitioners in public administration cope with the familiarity with the will and demands of UNCEPA principles.

Concerning knowledge of the principles, the following elaborates on the difference between claiming to be aware and knowing the UN-CEPA principles. Note the orange bars in the chart to follow the discussion. The highest score of awareness and knowledge relates to the pillar of transparency with 77% and 73%, respectively.

Figure 18: Comparison between Awareness and Knowledge %

Further, the way of implementation of most of the principles and strategies is not standardized. For instance, the claim on knowledge of principles is about 80%, but this can be contrasted with the ability to classify the principles correctly, which shows profound disparities.

African countries have different pressures and triggers to adopt, implement and nurture some of CEPA principles based on their domestic specificities. In a nutshell, social and political repressions, lack of Inclusiveness, and empowering women besides other structural weakness and constitutional reforms urged African countries to develop strategies pertinent to CEPA principles. In the next section, I discuss a few findings from the African countries' practices on CEPA principles.

Impact of COVID-19 on the Application and Implementation of these Principles

COVID-19 reveals institutional and human fragilities across the globe. The responsiveness and preparedness systems, if they exist, were challenged with the daunting consequences of the pandemic.

The survey shows that the least applied principle is subsidiarity. Not surprisingly so because it came out as the least known of the principles. Integrity has scored highest, but it was also high in the most known category. It came third to collaboration with eight experts, indicating that it is well known. It is therefore not surprising that it ranks high among the most applied principles. However, the converse is true for collaboration as the most applied of the principles, it scored 6 and came out at 5.

Figure 22: Extent of knowledge of principles %

Figure 3: The Least and Most Applicable Strategies as Per Responses

Focusing on the strategies, the least applicable strategy is the promotion of public sector diversity. On the other hand, the most applicable strategy has a tie of three; the three are respect for legality, multi-stakeholder forums, and results-based management. Burden of debt management, conflict of interests, and national statistical systems were emphasized amongst the threatened principles by COVID-19.

Figure 24: Least and most applicable strategies %

African experts also reflected on the overall impact of the pandemic as an opportunity or a threat to some of the strategies and their application as per Figure 4 on the next page. Some strategies (i.e., investment in e-government, enhancing statistical systems, collaboration, improvement of anti-corruption strategies, and community-driven development actions) can be promoted during shocks. On the contrary, long-term public management debt, competitive procurement policies, efficient and fair revenue administration, and fiscal federalism are threatened by such a disaster and consequent restrictive measures taken by governments.

Figure 4: Perceived Impact of COVID-19 on All UNCEPA Strategies Individually

Best Practices and Persistent Challenges

Egypt: The Government of Egypt has been adopting various administrative and economic reforms since 2011. The revolution of January 2011 remains the primary trigger of these reforms. Egypt has made progress in some of CEPA principles and strategies, including effectiveness and competence promotion of a professional public sector workforce, developing a promising 2030 vision for development, collaboration among government bodies, integrity, and transparency. Efforts on strengthening anti-corruption policies should also be recognized. Yet, the government is encouraged to address strategies of the principle of subsidiarity. It should also enact new laws which influence the sound policy-making principle.

Botswana: The country has been keeping good record of institutional reforms and development planning since independence. The Sound Policy-Making principle has been a lodestar for Botswana. The Government extended the five-year plans and added a long-term planning layer starting with 1996 when they developed Vision 2016. At the end of that period, Botswana emerged with a new Vision 2036. From this perspective, Botswana embraced the UNCEPA principles almost fifteen years before they were articulated. Botswana worked on their public administration's competence through the Human Resources (HR) Development Council as a deliberate strategy for training senior civil servants. While Botswana sustained a remarkable trajectory of five decades, it still struggles with budget transparency and food insecurity.

Ghana: There is reasonable progress on the effectiveness, accountability, and inclusiveness principles at the national level. These principles are embraced by the government's strategies, particularly in its decentralized planning systems following the 1994 Act of National Planning Systems. Ghana should also be commended for applying various integrity and transparency strategies as it is one of the few African countries that offer a robust anti-corruption coalition with a broad scope. However, it should be noted that although Ghana made significant progress during the Millennium Development Goals period, this was undermined by intra-sectoral coordination defects. In addition to this, data deficiencies hampered the ability to appreciate the extent of looming challenges.

Kenya: Political leadership in Kenya galvanizes the adoption and implementation of most of CEPA principles. Kenya undertook a self-assessment on how it fares on implementing the UNCEPA principles in December 2020. Since the adoption of the 2010 Constitution, Kenya has focused on the notion of a capable state. The necessary legislative instruments have been enacted, particularly those that give effect to the subsidiarity principle and transparency and anti-corruption efforts led by President Uhuru Kenyatta. Inclusiveness and decentralized governance approaches are also visible as the counties have been assigned fourteen key responsibilities and mandates. However, there is a persistent lack of financial resources allocated for counties. Furthermore, the assessment found the UNCEPA framework invaluable as it also revealed the uneven capacity that persists in the provision of public services.

Sudan: Sudan's current political transition offers an excellent opportunity to utilize CEPA principles in national development planning and among executives. The country has a long way to go in terms of strengthening the knowledge, implementation, and application of the referred principles. Among the most stressing demands for executives is providing tailored capacity-building training on good governance practices, some of which are CEPA principles: integrity, transparency, inclusiveness (gender-sensitive budgeting), strengthening the National Statistics System, revising civil service laws

and practices, establishing a national anti-corruption strategy and authority, and investment in information technology and digitalization.

South Africa: The country has given more focus on applying CEPA principles in the country within the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its impacts. South Africa's response to COVID-19 was hailed to be relatively comprehensive and inclusive. The national strategy aimed at saving lives and livelihoods through various restrictive and protective measures. South Africa's constitution is well aligned with the UNCEPA principles. In the planning of interventions, there is a greater alignment to the UNCEPA principles. As the pandemic hit the country, a strong sense of collaboration among government bodies was visibly recognized. South Africa set up a command structure led by the President himself and ministers to provide regular updates to the nation on government measures to respond to the pandemic. The policy framework aimed to leave no one behind. Temporary COVID relief packages, including cash transfer to the unemployed and those not qualifying for any social grants, were made available. Furthermore, health measures were also implemented by way of tracking and tracing with the assistance of over 28,000 community health workers. Thus, the principle of inclusiveness drove the agenda. The main problem has emanated from the accountability framework. Several unscrupulous businesspeople looted pandemic relief funds. The 200 billion rand business loan program has only disbursed 17 billion rand, and the President has lamented this underwhelming extension of credit by the banks.

Conclusion and Recommendations

CEPA principles' importance is unquestionable within the current and severe political and economic challenges countries are facing beyond the COVID-19 pandemic. The APRM should incorporate the principles into governance assessment reviews conducted on African states. In the light of the above evidence, we can gather a few key recommendations.

Whatever the national triggers were to apply CEPA principles, the principles are vital for translating policies and legislative frameworks into practical implementation tools. The UNCEPA principles have proven valuable during the pandemic, and country case studies have bolstered this evidence. With better awareness, knowledge, and understanding of these principles, it is possible to deploy them in times of pandemics effectively.

UNCEPA principles need to be systematically introduced to the planning systems of governments. Accordingly, the APRM is encouraged to develop a manual and a set of guidelines on CEPA Principles, and strategies should be designed to raise awareness and understanding of the principles alongside executive training for African national executives. This shall be aligned with APRM activities on strengthening good governance through its national governance structures.

Given the specificities of African countries and their various triggers for adopting and applying CEPA principles and strategies, country-specific studies should emerge from this APRM baseline study. This will raise awareness of the principles among national executives and increase the potential number of national respondents. A close working relationship between APRM and country national statistics offices is a non-negotiable for the principles to pass essential muster in terms of quality. For the proposed manual to be helpful, APRM should collaborate with the Praia City Group on Governance Statistics alongside African statistical organs, i.e., AFROSAI-E. This will be of great

assistance when the principles and their attendant indicators ripen towards the recognized indicators set for the SDGs at the United Nations Statistics Commission.

A pilot training program on training public administrators on these principles should be initiated without delay. The APRM will partner with the African Association for Public Administration and Management (APAAM) and other regional centres concerned about CEPA principles in Africa to develop such programs.

Synergies with other AU organs, particularly the AU Commission and the African Governance Architecture, are encouraged to cascade the CEPA principles at national levels.

Development support from strategic partners of the AU, including the United Nations, GIZ, SIDA, and the European Union, is imperative to provide financial and technical support to Member States in realizing the CEPA principles.

Chapter 3

VNRs & Transparency in the Era of COVID-19: Lessons Learned from the First Cycle of HLPF Reporting

Oli Henman, Global Coordinator of Action for Sustainable Development

Following the adoption of the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a regular reporting cycle was agreed in which every country is encouraged to provide a Voluntary National Review (VNR) report at least once every four years at the UN's High Level Political Forum (HLPF). These reviews provide a regular milestone for reporting against the indicators for measuring the SDGs once they are adjusted to each national context. In the first round, the VNRs helped to establish a baseline for monitoring and, in subsequent rounds, they can provide a way to track and measure progress on each of the goals.

In the context of SDG 3 on good health and wellbeing, how far has the need for accountability been delivered? What has been the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the transparency of reporting on this goal and on all the SDGs?

It is clear that there are still significant gaps in implementation according to the feedback from civil society organisations (CSOs) around the world. However, there may have been some movement in the steps towards greater transparency in a few areas.

Several clear observations emerge from the first cycle of SDG monitoring:

- The majority of countries now provide space for formal stakeholder engagement.
- Most countries have provided a baseline of data.
- Recent years have seen a reduction in focus on means of implementation and financing.
- More countries refer to 'leaving no one behind' but actual targeted support is still insufficient.
- There remains limited demonstrable progress in the transformative potential of the 2030 Agenda.
- Member States still do not appear to be making the most of mutual learning opportunities.

At Action for Sustainable Development (A4SD), we provide direct support in terms of a toolkit, advice and guidance on national parallel reports alongside the Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) and we have worked closely with a wide range of national partners to develop a comparative assessment of the engagement of civil society and overall progress of the goals in what we have termed the People's Scorecard. A full list of civil society reports from many countries since 2016 is available on our website here: https://action4sd.org/resources-toolkits/

VNR Reporting in Times of COVID

With the growing impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, many consultation meetings began to be hosted virtually beginning in March 2020. This also led to a number of national dialogues being limited and regional forums being postponed in the first year of the pandemic, while remaining fully

virtual in 2021. Furthermore, the High Level Political Forum (HLPF) itself was also hosted in a fully virtual format in 2020 and 2021, which led to several presentations being pre-recorded, challenges with live video links, and a more limited opportunity for dialogue. This virtual setting also led to a disconnect between formal sessions and informal spaces.

At the same time, for several national partners, the move to primarily online engagement actually enabled some local community organisations to be directly included in a way that might not have been possible if they had to travel and finance visa costs to participate. In this way, a certain number of national partners were able to engage with their own country's VNR presentation directly online.

In order to understand the full impact of the shift to online formats, a survey was shared in August 2020 with all Major Groups and other Stakeholders through the Coordination Mechanism to assess their views on the opportunities for participation. 130 responses were received from respondents in 48 countries, and the highest number of responses came from respondents based in the USA, India, Nepal, Bangladesh, UK and Mexico.

Responses came in from all of the recognised stakeholder groups active at the HLPF:

- 69 respondents self-identified with more than one group.
- The highest proportion of responses came from groups self-identifying as NGOs; Women; or Children & Youth

Many of the responses highlighted the apparent challenges faced in terms of digital accessibility. There were a number of comments regarding accessibility, including challenges to digital connectivity, a lack of interpretation and translation, and barriers to disability access such as the absence of closed captions and sign language. There is a risk that the shift to a primarily online space in response to the COVID-19 pandemic continues to perpetuate exclusion and that a number of stakeholders with limited digital connectivity are further excluded.

As has already been noted, several stakeholder groups also highlighted a disconnect between the official events and the side events since the digital hosting of the sessions does not allow for informal exchange on the margins of the meetings and the primarily 'broadcast' nature of many of the sessions led to a sense of limited dialogue and a reduced opportunity for meaningful exchange.

In order to enable better opportunities for transparency and accountability, the responses highlighted the importance of establishing more space for shared agenda setting and greater civil society engagement in the preparation of the HLPF so that more of the sessions are 'co-designed.' Furthermore, there was a strong suggestion that future 'blended formats' would need to be carefully organised so that the virtual participation could work effectively and inclusively alongside a physical meeting in the future.

Finally, many of the organisations interviewed highlighted that for real accountability in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a need to make the 'Leave No One Behind' commitment a much higher priority. The VNRs should incorporate a clear assessment of the principle of leaving no one behind with specific information on the support provided to the most marginalised groups in society.

Impact of the Pandemic on the 2030 Agenda

Turning now to the direct impact of the pandemic on the delivery of the 2030 Agenda, there has been widespread concern that many of the goals will become harder to achieve in the face of the global health emergency.

Coming together in April 2020, a broad coalition of CSOs pushed for a joined-up response to the pandemic. A joint statement was prepared with key partners including ActionAid, Action for Sustainable Development, GCAP, CIVICUS, Oxfam, Restless Development, Femnet, Women Deliver, and many more. In fact, by September 2020 more than 800 groups had signed and shared the statement here: https://action4sd.org/COVID-19-citizen-action/

These demands have continued moving forward to call for a Great Recovery that is healthy, green, and just. You can find the broader joint demands here: https://greatrecovery.net/

The concerns raised collectively focus first on the direct health impacts of the pandemic. For example, disparities in healthcare provision are leading to disproportionate impact on fatalities and poor health outcomes in developing countries. This is further compounded by the unequal provision of treatment and vaccines, where the world's wealthiest countries prioritized their own population and were unwilling to share significant number of doses or lift patent protections on the COVID-19 vaccines. This hoarding by wealthier countries further exacerbated inequalities and led to significantly higher death tolls in developing countries.

Furthermore, there is the concern that there will be a further massive impact due to the global economic slowdown as a result of the pandemic. This is leading to higher costs for many materials and many essential products, which in turn leads to higher cost of living and a more challenging economic situation in many contexts.

At this time of compounding global emergencies, there is a need for increased solidarity between countries. However, many donor nations have been reducing their international support and prioritizing their own national demands. The importance of multilateralism and a coherent, integrated international response has been raised by many stakeholder groups. This should include mobilizing health supplies, but also debt reduction and provision of wider financing.

Finally, there is a clear need to connect the response to the pandemic to a clear plan for a just and sustainable recovery. The moment of recovery and rebuilding can provide a key step towards embedding a different economic model for the coming years. Many groups have been working together to call for recovery packages funded by trillions of dollars in additional international financing that deliver a fairer, safer, greener and healthier future. Potential measures include new Special Drawing Rights, debt restructuring, better aid, and far more support from multilateral development banks. This should also be accompanied by a global commitment to taxing companies and individuals fairly as well as incentivising positive social and environmental performance throughout the economy to strengthen corporate accountability and create a regenerative and circular economy.

Recommendations for Improved Transparency & Accountability

In the concluding section of this chapter, I will share several recommendations on ways to strengthen the transparency and accountability of the HLPF in light of our experience over the past two years.

One of the central recommendations shared by stakeholder communities is that in order to deliver on the aspiration to leave no one behind, it is crucial to ensure a wide range of voices can be heard throughout the process of review of the SDGs. The engagement of communities must now move beyond a tokenistic broadcast format. It is not sufficient to provide a mere 2-minute intervention at the end of a session at the HLPF. Instead, there should be a move towards genuine co-design with communities on the agreed priorities that are set out in the 2030 Agenda.

Furthermore, there should be concerted steps taken towards co-decision on the main findings of the VNRs so that all stakeholders are able to inform their country's official VNR statement. This would require sufficient time for meaningful engagement to start well in advance at the national level to ensure that all stakeholders are given time to provide their expertise and inputs into a 'whole of society' review. These reviews should be developed in a collaborative way with all relevant stakeholders to ensure a realistic picture of the current situation as well as areas for improvement.

When considering the national level engagement, it is vital to embed the VNRs in the national planning process so that the SDG review plays a key part in establishing a moment of assessment within the longer-term development planning process for each country. There should also be a reminder for all countries that, according to the UN Secretary General's Voluntary Reporting Guidelines, countries should consider *all SDGs* in their reviews and identify inter-linkages between the Goals.

In terms of the HLPF sessions themselves, there is a need to consider ways to bridge the digital divide and ensure online accessibility, including interpretation capabilities, disability access such as closed captions and sign language, and the possibility of meeting in a physical hub in country for improved digital connectivity. More time should be given to each VNR so that there is sufficient time for a wider range of questions as well as realistic time for responses from Member States.

Looking ahead to the next steps of the HLPF, it will be important to learn and incorporate some elements of digitalisation and virtual meetings, such as the presence of national partners via video link. Therefore, there is an opportunity to combine physical and virtual formats to reach a wide range of participants. Finally, many stakeholder groups have been highlighting the need for improved engagement and meaningful participation across all UN meetings. There is a growing need to establish clear mechanisms to support real interactive dialogue in official sessions across the UN, and this could be supported by the establishment of an 'envoy' for civil society at the UN.

Chapter 4

Turning the Global Momentum on Sustainability into Practical Local Action

Jessica Lobo, Global Goals Programme Manager for the UN Global Compact Network UK

The UN Global Compact Network UK (UNGC UK) is part of the world's largest responsible business initiative connecting UK companies and other organisations in a global movement dedicated to driving sustainable growth. Through an extensive programme of activity, UNGC UK promotes practical sustainability leadership, shares knowledge across sectors, and actively shapes the responsible business environment to create a world we want to live and do business in.

The United Nations Global Compact's universally recognised Principles, rooted in UN treaties, provide a robust foundation from which UNGC UK leads UK business action on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). With more than 700 members in the UK, UNGC UK's mission is to turn the global momentum on sustainability into practical local action and works alongside 68 other local networks, using its power to convene business and other organisations to find practical solutions to global challenges.

The UK Network's three strategic pillars are to inspire business ambition to deliver the Global Goals, to enable practical action that delivers sustainable business growth, and to shape a responsible business environment.

Inspiring Business Ambition to Deliver the Global Goals

As a blueprint for a more sustainable and inclusive future, the SDGs represent a compelling growth strategy for business, so raising awareness of the Goals and mobilising action to deliver them is central to UNGC UK's mission. UNGC UK hosts over 70 public events a year to inspire business to engage with the SDGs as a holistic framework, to enable companies to explore key sustainability challenges with expert speakers and sustainability leaders, and to motivate business to develop innovative solutions for the Goals. This includes the flagship event, the Responsible Business & SDGs Summit, which in 2021 saw over 2,100 attendees join across two days of programming to discuss themes including business reporting on the SDGs, sustainable finance, ESG, local action, and setting ambitious corporate targets for the 2030 Agenda.

Case study: SDG Integration

Companies often report that the main challenges with contributing to the SDGs are navigating the complex framework, finding ways to meaningfully understand and measure impact, and embedding the Goals throughout the entire organisation. In spring 2021, UNGC UK hosted a four-part SDG Integration webinar series for companies to explore a strategic and integrated approach to the Goals. The webinars focused on: understanding the SDGs and raising ambition; defining priorities and setting goals; deepening implementation across the organization; and enhancing stakeholder engagement. Participants joined from 39 different countries to hear guest presentations from companies including Unilever, Tesco, Sky, Natura & Co, and WWF. More than four out of five participants (86%) said that, as a result of the webinars, they had ideas or inspiration to take action on the 2030 Agenda. The webinars are available to watch on-demand and continue to be a valuable and free resource for companies beginning to engage with the SDGs.

UNGC UK also provides the insight and support for companies to address specific SDG issues. The Black Lives Matter & Business webinar series, for example, takes a deep dive into the actions that companies can take to embed anti-racism into their behaviours, practices, and policies. Similarly, events on eliminating child labour in the supply chain, building business climate resilience, and transitioning to net zero all offer opportunities for participants to learn from best practices, case studies, and leading companies that are driving these agendas forward.

Enabling Practical Action that Delivers Sustainable Business Growth

UNGC UK's position at the centre of a network of leading companies, thematic experts, and other stakeholders allows the Network to identify good practice in sustainable business and disseminate the connections, knowledge, and tools to see it implemented. UNGC UK convenes working groups on themes such as diversity and inclusion, modern slavery, child labour, and climate-related financial disclosures that enable deeper discussions into these areas of special importance to Network members.

UNGC UK also delivers a number of accelerator programmes on climate, gender equality, SDG innovation, and SDG ambition to support companies seeking to embed SDG-aligned practices deep into their business operations, into their core business strategy, and across their value chain.

Case study: SDG Ambition
Translating the SDGs for business and setting the right levels of ambition to contribute to the Goals remain to be key challenges faced by the private sector. SDG Ambition is a six-month accelerator programme designed to bridge this gap, support companies in achieving ambitious corporate targets, and accelerating the integration of the SDGs into core business management. Participants are empowered and equipped to develop and implement innovative business strategies that help meet growing stakeholder demands and investor expectations around sustainability. Ty Jones, Director, Corporate Social Responsibility & Engagement at DWF Law, said "the programme helped us decide where to focus our efforts and what our key stakeholders were looking for." Ty explained that "it's been a catalyst for getting the business on board with our ambitious sustainability targets" and speaks about the value in helping drive day-to-day sustainability behaviours.

Case study: Target Gender Equality
Through facilitated performance analysis, capacity building workshops, peer-to-peer learning, and multi-stakeholder dialogue at the country-level, the Target Gender Equality Accelerator Programme supports companies in strengthening their contribution to Sustainable Development Goal 5.5, which calls for equal women's representation, participation, and leadership in business. Companies are equipped with the latest data and research supporting the business case for gender equality and gain insights from UN partners and experts on how to reach ambitious corporate targets and accelerate progress on gender equality. Gary Carney, Corporate Social Responsibility at The Very Group and one of the participants in the programme, said "as a part of our participation in Target Gender Equality we've expanded the conversation internally around gender equality and are looking at what targets we need in place to improve equality representation, particularly in the top of the business." To date, 47 companies have participated in the programme in the UK and have used the Women's Empowerment Principles Gender Gap Analysis Tool to assess their current policies and programmes, understand areas for improvement, and identify opportunities to set future corporate goals and targets.

Shaping a Responsible Business Environment

The third pillar in UNGC UK's strategy, to shape a responsible business environment, looks at the role the Network can play in advocating for the Goals and working with a wide community of stakeholders to strengthen local action, support partnerships, and lobby for national implementation of the SDGs.

Case study: Letter to the Prime Minister to Build Back Better
In 2020, UNGC UK coordinated a letter with UK Stakeholders for Sustainable Development (UKSSD) and leaders of over 150 businesses, civil society organisations, and from public life to call on the Prime Minister to use the SDGs to create a socially just and green recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. The letter recommends that the SDGs be used to prioritise the most vulnerable in our society and level-up regional and societal inequalities, to build coherent policies for a healthy planet and aid the transition to net zero, and to unite all sectors behind a plan to build a stronger and more resilient economy. On the launch of the letter, filmmaker and SDG Advocate, Richard Curtis said: "The COVID crisis has shown more than ever that we must work together to secure a better future. The Global Goals are a powerful tool to help us do this; they provide a common vision and a practical blueprint for collaboration. The breadth of support for this letter demonstrates a commitment to working with the UK government to deliver healthy lives, healthy societies, and a healthy planet for everyone. We can only build back better together and I hope that the Government will use the Goals to help them do this." A response was issued by Rt Hon Anne-Marie Trevelyan MP, Secretary of State, who acknowledged the importance of the SDGs in the Decade of Action and highlighted events such as COP26 and the G7 presidency which provide opportunities for the Government to underscore the importance of sustainable recovery.

Climate action is high on the agenda in the UK as a result of hosting COP26, but the interconnections and complexities between climate reduction, biodiversity and ecosystem services, and social issues cannot be neglected. UNGC UK's climate work will focus on setting science-based targets, transitioning to net zero, building climate resilience, and driving green finance, whilst demonstrating the importance of using the SDGs as a holistic framework to address these challenges. This will be critical to ensuring that we can turn the global momentum on sustainability into practical local action to meet the 2030 Agenda.

Chapter 5

Voluntary Local Review Experience in Ngora District, Uganda

Priscilla Margrey, District Planner in Ngora District Local Government

Four years and midway into the implementation of Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development and the first 10-year implementation plan of Agenda 2063, respectively, there is serious concern that the goals of the two Agendas may not be achieved in Africa within the set time frame. While there has been progress in the implementation of some of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), serious lags remain in many areas.

As part of efforts to step up the implementation scale and pace, countries in the Africa Regional Forum on Sustainable Development (ARFSD) and High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) in 2019 underlined the need to support Voluntary Local Reviews to ensure close alignment of national and sub-national development frameworks – including budgets, plans, and legal frameworks – with that of the goals of Agenda 2030 and Agenda 2063.

Participative Voluntary Local Review (VLRs) were identified as an important tool for meaningful multi-stakeholder engagement and mobilization to advance the implementation of these two agendas. Ngora district therefore is privileged to be among the localities conducting the VLR in 2020.

This VLR for Ngora district is a follow-up action of the Voluntary National Review that the country conducted as a readiness exercise and report for the implementation of the SDGs. This comes after three years of Uganda having volunteered to be assessed for alignment of her policies, strategic frameworks, and legal frameworks which overall scored 75 percent in terms of alignment to Agenda 2030 and Agenda 2063 of the African Union. The United Nations has produced SDG progress reports since 2015 which have shed light on the progress the country is making. This has helped in planning and refocusing efforts towards achieving the SDGs.

The Ngora District Local Review assessed all seventeen (17) SDGs but with emphasis on key targets that are already aligned with the District Development Plan (DDP). These include: increasing food security, improved health, increase in tree cover, increased access to quality education, and access to adequate safe and clean water. Therefore, the review indicates alignment of the DDP to the two agendas and is therefore a good basis for continued monitoring of progress against the set targets for shared learning across other local governments. The Ngora District Local Review provides lessons and innovations on what the district has done in an effort to implement the set targets and accelerate achievement of goals and indicators as seen in: the highlights of the review process and linkages with national policies, integration of SDGs, and Agenda 2063 in the planning, financing, monitoring and frameworks; thee status of implementation of SDGs and corresponding Agenda 2063; how the district of Ngora has integrated sustainable agendas and the principle of leaving no one behind; the good practices and lessons learnt; the challenges for national attention and the way forward below.

Review Process and Linkages with the National VNR Process

The Ngora District Voluntary Local Review process looked at the wider development spectrum covering institutional frameworks, aspects of leaving no one behind, progress on implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, analysis of the District Development Plan of 2015-2020, review of reports, policy, and legal documents, feedback from interviews, focus group discussions, and key informants and consultative meetings with selected groups. Review of key Government and UN reference documents on SDGs like the Handbook for National Voluntary Local Review for aspects relating to local.

The Ngora VLR was conducted within the National Road Map for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) implementation. The review utilized the already existing coordination mechanisms and stakeholders both at national and district levels for the provision of core information for the VLR. At the national level, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) was part of the process of Ngora VLR and the district level had both political and technocrats contributing to the VLR. The Minister of State in Charge of General Duties in the OPM coordinates the implementation of the SDGs and an SDG Secretariat was also put in place. The Ngora District planner served as a focal person for the coordination of SDGs and worked in close collaboration with OPM during the VLR exercise in the district.

Status of Implementation of the SDGs and Corresponding Goals of Agenda 2063

Summary of scores

SDG 1 – 45.5%
SDG 2 – 69%
SDG 3 - 50%
SDG 4 – 55%
SDG 5 – 48%
SDG 6 – 88%
SDG 9 – 20%
SDG 13 -79%
SDG 16 -50%
SDG 17 -60%
SDGs 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14 and 15 had no data at the sub-local level

Figure 1: Summary of district performance at a glance. Drawn by VLR Expert.

The lack of data for SDGs 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14 and 15 at the sub-local levels could mean that these goals are not very well integrated into development plan and not well implement and monitored at the sub-national level and efforts have been put in place in the DDP to address data gaps, such strengthening data collection, indicator setting and development of a statistics plan with a focus on evaluation of the statistics.

How Ngora District Has Addressed the Integrated & Indivisible Nature Of SDGs & the Principle of "Leave No One Behind"

The district implements via a decentralized system of service delivery which is empowering and provides room for participation of different stakeholders at different levels – village, parish, sub-county – to the district and national levels in a coordinated approach.

Ngora District Local Government (DLG) has a district technical planning committee where planning is done jointly and is led by the district planning unit which is also the SDGs coordinator. The planning unit brings together all the district heads of departments/sectors, civil society, the private sector, as well as local leaders and counsellors. The plans are generated right from the village level, to sub-county then to the district where they are consolidated into one plan by the planning department, ensuring harmony and interdependence across the SDGs. There is joint monitoring of field activities and SDGs thus allowing learning.

The district and sub-counties are guided by the Local Government Planning Guidelines that put emphasis on integration with the SDGs, including a focus on gender and empowerment of women, girls, and other vulnerable categories, human rights, population issues, HIV/AIDs, and nutrition. This contributes to the achievement of gender equality and empowerment of all women and girls and other vulnerable groups in an effort to leave no one behind.

Good Practices & Lessons Learned

Ngora district demonstrated good practice in utilizing a partnership approach (as outlined in Goal 17) to services delivery at different levels. At the district and sub-county level, the activities are planned and implemented in partnership between the local government, civil society, private sector, religious leaders, cultural leaders, political leaders, and youth and women groups. VLR was an opportunity to unlock gaps and incorporate in the new DDPIII.

The implementation of the sustainable development agenda created some results because it was state-led and was easy to integrate into existing coordination structures and ongoing processes and programs. It was easy to leverage partnerships due to the interdependence across goals which has initiated a close working relationship across different stakeholders who contribute to the 17 SDGs.

Challenges Encountered for National Attention

Data was a key challenge identified, especially disaggregated data at the district and sub-county levels, which made analysis difficult. The national SDGs localised indicators are inadequate and need to be widened in number to capture the aspects of quality that are very important for the sustainable agendas. We found no set targets on SDGs thus making benchmarking of performance a challenge.

The sustainable development agendas have been mainstreamed within the Ngora District Development Plan but there still exist capacity gaps, especially on linkages between the interventions and the sustainable development targets and indicators.

The financial allocation formula provided by the Central Government to the sub-national/district level lacks adequacy in terms of allowing integration across the SDGs. It needs to be strengthened to allow this flexibility. The guidelines on distribution of resources are inadequate and these do not look at the quality and sustainability of the services provided.

The mindset issue and community attitude towards work and innovation has been a result of inadequacy in education reforms. The existing education system does not train to create jobs. There is a need for skill-based training and an emphasis on vocational training institutions. The current reform emphasis in education is on curriculum which targets a single class with no adequate match in terms of material availability for both academic and co-curricular activities.

Next Steps

Ngora district is looking at becoming a model local government district for Uganda by working to support replication across other local governments and cities within the country by having them conduct voluntary local reviews as well as integrate the findings of the Voluntary Local Review of Ngora into to policy, legal and institutional frameworks across the country.

Ngora will champion local launches, profiling, and learning to accelerate the pace on implementation of Agenda 2030 over the remaining decade. Leaders have committed to working together and noted that SDGs require massive action that leaves no one behind as well as no place left behind in the development processes.

Context of Ngora District

Geographically, the Ngora District, one of the 134 rural districts, is located in the eastern part of Uganda. The district has a total population of 142,487 with 74,270 females and 68,217 males (Census 2014). The population projection for 2019/20 is 165,800 people. Ngora district is approximately 326 kilometers from Uganda's capital – Kampala.

Figure 2: Map of Ngora District.

Figure 2: Maps – Ngora District

53

Social Context

The district has a total of 23,683 households with an average household size of 7 people. 23.5 percent of the households are headed by females, while 0.17 percent of the households are headed by children (aged 10-17) and 20.5 percent of the households are headed by youths (aged 18-30 years). 57.7 percent of the population is aged 0-17 years. 9.8 percent of the population is aged 6-15 years do not attend school, with 9.1 percent females aged 6-15 years not attending school as compared to 10.5 percent of their male counterparts not attending school. Only 85 percent of persons aged 6-15 years attend school. Ngora has one (1) county, 5 lower local governments (LLGs) which includes 1 town council, and 4 sub-counties. The district has 65 parishes and 139 villages.

This kind of social context indicates there so many people who are vulnerable and need greater access to quality social services to empower them to contribute towards the sustainable development agendas.

Economic Context

The district's main activity is agriculture, both the planting of crops and rearing of animals. However, this has not adequately raised income levels of the district, thus leaving a good number of people below the poverty line. The district budget is mainly financed through the central government allocations, which, for the last four years (2015-2019), has been the highest source of financing for the district contributing up to a total of 80 percent. However, there are other finances that support projects – mainly from civil society organizations. The VLR review established that local revenue collection is another source of financing for the district. The major sources of local revenue include property income – which constitutes 54 percent – generated from market rent, animal husbandry related duties, agency fees, and registration of births and marriage certificates. Local tax constitutes 10 percent of the local revenue and is in form of land fees and business and other licenses. There is a large number of other potential revenue sources in the district that local revenue could be tapped from like revenue from tendered markets that need to be strengthened. However, one outstanding gap issue is that the local staffing in terms of Parish Chiefs who would help in revenue mobilization is too small to cover the entire sub county. For instance, Mukura sub county still has staffing gaps to be filled.

There will be need for the district to tap into other sources of local revenue that are not yet established, especially land premium and ground rent through strengthening systems and development of key parameters for evaluation and full revenue collection. In addition, there is need to build capacity at sub-county and parish levels to set revenue targets as part of their performance measurement so that local revenue is fully collected and efficiently and effectively utilized for implementation and the sustainability of communal projects like roads that would connect people and enhance development.

Political Context

The district has laws, policies, strategies, and leadership that inform the district priorities. The district has both technical and political leadership where the Chief Administrative Officer leads the technical team of the district while the District Chairperson leads the political arm of the district and performs

the oversight role of monitoring implementation of programs. This creates a good balance in terms of accountability and transparency, which are necessary for the sustainability of services. The district has developed different laws to enhance the implementation of the sustainable development agendas, and these laws are aligned to the national supreme law – the 1995 constitution of the Republic of Uganda.

Institutional and Governance Structure

Ngora DLG operates in a decentralised system of governance that gives power to the lower local governments to raise their own resources and develop plans from the village level, harmonised at the parish level to form sub-county plans that eventually feed into the District Development Plan (DDP).

The district is headed by a Chief Accounting Officer (CAO) and together with Heads of Departments/Sector constitute the Technical Planning Committee. The political side is headed by the Chairperson Local Council 5 (LC 5), who also has an Executive Committee composed of Chairpersons of Sectoral Committees and counsellors.

The above structure shows the main departments that have different mandates and together cover all the 17 Goals to a degree of 85 percent, except for a few Goals that are not as relevant for Ngora as a rural local government. For example, Goal 11 is more relevant for cities and Goal 14 deals with protecting our oceans and coasts; since the district is landlocked and has no access to a sea or ocean save for the tributaries of Lake Kyoga, Goal 14 is also not as relevant for Ngora. The rest of the Goals fit within the mandate of the district through its approved management structure. The governance and institutional structure are a mirror of the key ministries at the national level charged with the responsibility of planning and budgeting for sustainable development of communities such as: Health; Works and Transport; Water and Environment; Education and Sports; Agriculture; Finance, Planning and Economic Development; and Gender, Labour and Social Development.

Ngora district plans are guided by a National Vision 2040 that informs the development of five-year development plans which are aligned with the with the District Development Plans. The plans come right from the village level to the parish level and consolidate as sub-county plans which are submitted to the district to inform the priorities of the 5-year District Development Plans. All the planning is guided by the National Planning Authority and the monitoring is coordinated by the Office of the Prime Minister. All these development frameworks fit within the long-term Vision 2040 and are linked to the sustainable development agenda as well as the 2063 Agenda of the African Union.

Ngora district joined the global and regional advocacy efforts on tree planting as part of the Paris Agreement; the DDP of 2015/16 to 2019/20 integrated this aspiration of the Paris Agreement by making tree planting one of its key performance indicators and the third objective of the DDP. The link between the Paris Agreement and trees is clear as forests are key allies for combating climate change and meeting the long-term goal of restoring the ecological balance of Planet Earth by the second half of the century. Ngora DLG motivated community members to plant trees and forests because of the key role they play in assisting efforts to meet the goals of the sustainability agendas, especially SDG Goal 13 that emphasizes urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts and Agenda 2063 Goal 7 that pushes for environmentally sustainable and climate resilient economies and

communities. However, the district still needs to establish disaster risk management plans and implement them to realize change.

The trees are very important given their role is absorbing carbon, cleaning and cooling the air, acting as natural water pumps to sustain the water table, stabilizing soils, recycling nutrients for agriculture, and supporting habitats for wildlife to name just a few of their gifts to humanity and Ngora district in particular.

Insofar as the district had some idea about the SDGs, there was a gap on awareness of Agenda 2063; the district had limited knowledge of the global development frameworks such as the Paris Agreement, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the New Urban Agenda, and the Africa Continent Free Trade Area Agreement. These need to be popularized so that the localities appreciate the linkages. This calls for the need to popularize the SDGs and the 2063 Agenda.

Methodology and Process for Preparation of the VLR

This section elaborates on the methodology that was adopted for the review as well as its scope, depth, and limitations. It also elaborates on the contribution of the different levels and sectors of government to the review and the engagement of political/parliamentary representatives at different levels, stakeholders from civil society, representatives of vulnerable groups, academia, youths, the business sector, and development partners.

The methodology was both qualitative and quantitative in nature and a stakeholder engagement map was developed to guide the consultation process. Stakeholder mapping and identification of the key targets for consultation was done and participation of different stakeholders was considered. These included CSOs, the private sector, government officials, management committees, and local leaders at both the district and national levels. A focal point person was identified at the district level (the district planner) and at the national level (the Head of the SDGs secretariat) to facilitate linkages with different key stakeholders.

Document Review

The literature review looked at existing reports, national frameworks like the SDGs implementation framework, the second National Development Plan (NDP II and 111), and SDG reports prepared at the national level; these included the Second District Development Plan, annual work plans, quarterly physical progressive reports, the DDP II Midterm Review Report, budget framework papers, budget estimates, annual statistical abstracts, project profiles, audit reports, Civil Society Organization (CSO) reports, National Development Plan II, Agenda 2030 on the SDGs and Agenda 2063 of the African Union. Consultative meetings were implemented in the 5 Lower-Level Governments each comprised of 350 participants from CSOs, CBOs, the private sector, opinion leaders, LCIIIs, sub-county chiefs, parliamentarians, CDOs, men, youth, women, elders leaders, and special interest groups (e.g., PWDs, PLHIV/AIDs, elders, religious leaders, SMCs, HUMCs, PTAs etc.). Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were created and discussions centred on key targeted groups of women and youth mainly to collect their views and perceptions on development of their communities and their participation in the development processes. The FGDs were composed of 8-12 persons from different villages of the sub-counties.

Key Informant Interviews

Key Informant Interviews mainly targeted the District Chairperson (LC 5), CAO, RDC, members of the District Executive Committee, heads of institutions including schools and health facilities, heads of departments, CSOs, the private sector, and parliamentarians to name but a few. The face-to-face interviews targeted mainly the health unit management committees (HUMCs), school management committees (SMCs), water use committees, development partners, the private sector,, and opinion leaders. Given their key role in the running of development programs and monitoring, they provided a great contribution to the review.

Focus Group Discussions

The focus group discussions mainly focused on special interest groups such as women, youth, elderly, people living with HIV/AIDs, farmer groups, community associations, etc.

Radio talk shows and gathering feedback was the other key tool that attracted the participation of different leaders such as the District Chairperson, Members of Parliament, and Chief Administrative Officer as they participated in a live radio talk show where community members from all over the Eastern region provided feedback regarding development and what they need to see from their leaders which, among others, is accountability. Stories of the VLR in Ngora district were also aired on television as well as over the radios (e.g. Voice of Teso Radio).

Progress on Goals and Targets – Overall Analysis

Figure 3: Ngora SDG Progress Dashboard

Chapter 6

Finland's Whole of Society Approach to the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda

Sami Pirkkala, Secretary General Finnish National Commission on Sustainable Development

The adoption of the 2030 Agenda marked a shift in global sustainability and development paradigms. It brought global efforts for poverty eradication, stemming from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), together with efforts for preserving our common ecological capital, deriving from the Rio Earth Summit in 1992.

At country level, the 2030 Agenda has changed our understanding of what is meant by development. In the era of the MDGs, the need for development was attributed to countries with a low-income level, thus also referred to as developing countries. Now, in the era of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, needs for development are assessed against the SDG framework. In this framework, needs for development exist in all countries. Some of the SDGs are more challenging for developing low-income countries, whereas developed high-income countries have work to do in some other SDGs.

Thus, in the era of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, all countries can and should identify themselves as developing countries. This, however, does not mean that the least developed countries' need for economic development would bear less significance than before. What it does mean is that our understanding of "development" and what is meant by sustainable development has changed and is now defined by the SDGs. It also means that countries have different kinds of developmental needs, depending mainly of their level of economic development.

This article is based on my presentation at the Friends of Governance for Sustainable Development workshop on March 23, 2021. It focuses on Finland's approach to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Finland has prepared sustainability strategies since the Rio Summit in 1992, and the engagement of the whole of society has always been at the heart of Finland's national policymaking. A National Commission on Sustainable Development was established in 1993, and has operated since then under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister.

During the past three decades Finland's national sustainability work has gone through many phases, and the political interest in sustainability issues has also varied over time. In 2015, the adoption of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs gave a new impetus to Finland's national sustainability work. It also strengthened the linkage between national and global spheres of sustainable development.

Even though many changes have taken place over almost 30 years, involvement of the society as a whole in national sustainability debate and practice has remained at the core of the "Finnish model."

The guiding principle has been that the Government has the responsibility for leading national sustainability work, but building a sustainable society is not possible without the participation of all Finns. In the era of the 2030 Agenda, this idea is more valid than ever: the government(s) are responsible for reaching all the SDGs by 2030, but no government can reach the SDGs without the contribution and engagement of the society as a whole.

In what follows, I will give an overall picture of Finland's national structure for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Following the key lines of my presentation in the Friends of Governance

meeting in March 2021, I will first describe the role and key actions taken by the Government since 2015. After that I will describe how the National Commission on Sustainable Development has worked for the engagement of the whole of society.

Key Actions Taken by the Government Since 2015

In early 2016, after the adoption of the 2030 Agenda in the UN, the Government of the Prime Minister Juha Sipilä decided to transfer the **planning and coordination of national implementation of the 2030 Agenda to the Prime Minister's Office** (PMO). This change was done mainly for two reasons: to underline the importance of all the three dimensions of sustainable development, and to ensure effective cross-sectorial coordination between the ministries. Up until 2016, the coordination of national sustainability work took place from the Ministry of the Environment, where the secretariat of the National Commission on Sustainable Development was located.

A national **inter-ministry coordination network** on sustainable development had been established at the Ministry of the Environment at an earlier stage. In practice, moving national coordination from MoE to PMO meant that the person responsible for the coordination network – the Deputy Secretary General of the NCSD – was moved from the MoE to PMO. At this point, the Secretary General of the NCSD remained in the MoE. Additional resources were allocated to coordination at the PMO. In 2020, also the position of the Secretary General of the NCSD was moved to PMO.

In 2016, the PMO started the preparations of **Government's first implementation plan for the 2030 Agenda**. The first step was to commission an independent gap analysis, where Finland's current situation against the goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda were assessed. The gap analysis identified the areas where further action was required, as well as those where Finland's national situation was good.

The preparation of the Government implementation plan in 2017 was accompanied by a significant decision to submit the **implementation plan to the Parliament** as a Government report. In Finland, all Government reports to the Parliament face a very thorough scrutiny: reports are first discussed in the Plenary, then nominated to one of Parliament's 17 Committees, and then discussed in all relevant Committees. After this, the nominated Parliamentary Committee prepares a report and recommendations, which are then discussed and adopted in the Plenary Session. The response and recommendations of the Parliament are then submitted to the Government, and the Government is obliged to report annually to the Parliament on its actions vis-à-vis Parliament's recommendations. So, in practice, submitting a Government report to Parliament in any topic leads into an establishment of an annual dialogue between the Government and the Parliament, which will cease only when the Parliament so decides.

In the Parliament Plenary debate in 2017, the Government implementation plan for the 2030 Agenda was nominated to the Committee for the Future. After Parliamentary scrutiny, the Parliament gave the Government 10 recommendations on national implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

In 2020, the new Government updated the national implementation plan, which was again submitted to the Parliament, and nominated to the Committee for the Future. The Parliament responded in 2021, giving the Government 14 new recommendations on national implementation.

In 2016 Finland prepared the **first Voluntary National Review (VNR)** to the UN High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF). In that VNR, Finland expressed its determination to take serious action to implement the 2030 Agenda by introducing the institutional mechanisms, tools and plans that were already in place or needed to be established. The report also highlighted Finland's baseline in relation to the SDGs and described where the biggest strengths and weaknesses in the implementation lied. The first VNR was a useful report in compiling all the ideas and plans into one document providing a future roadmap. The preparation of the VNR strengthened the already existing dialogue between the Government, civil society and other stakeholders around the 2030 Agenda and its implementation in Finland. The VNR was prepared after the 2016 gap analysis, and provided an opportunity for an extensive dialogue on Finland's situation vis-à-vis the SDGs.

In 2020 Finland prepared a **second VNR** to the HLPF. Whereas the first VNR focused on Finland's determination to take serious action to implement the 2030 Agenda, the second VNR presented a science-based analysis on the progress on goals and targets. The 2020 VNR also included new approaches for intensified participation, most pertinent being the invitation by the Government to several stakeholders to provide their own assessments on the progress made as part of the VNR report. This invitation was received by civil society, cities, business organizations and regional authorities. Over 50 actors of civil society, including NGOs and trade unions, took part in the assessment of Finland's performance.

Another significant practice, that was established in the Government 2017 implementation plan, was the decision to commission an **independent evaluation of national implementation of the 2030 Agenda at the end of each Parliamentary term**. The purpose of the evaluation is to provide information on the effectiveness of the policy measures taken to achieve the objectives of the 2030 Agenda. The information provided by the evaluation strengthens the ability of the next government to design and implement effective policies for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

The first national evaluation on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda took place in 2019. The evaluation team presented the findings and recommendations of the evaluation to political parties prior to 2019 Parliamentary elections, and then, after the elections, to parties of the coalition Government during the negotiations of the Government program. The second national evaluation will start in March 2022, and will have its key findings and recommendations ready by the end of 2022. Next Parliamentary elections will take place in April 2023.

Finland's **national follow-up system** was renewed in 2017. It consists of around 45 indicators that are grouped in ten baskets with specific themes, such as "Resource-wise economy and carbon-neutral society", "Housing and communities", "Social inequality" and "Global responsibility and policy coherence". Around 1/3 of national indicators are from the global SDG indicator set, 2/3 are country specific. National indicators were chosen in 2017 by national follow-up network that is chaired by the Prime Minister's Office, and includes representatives from ministries, Statistics Finland, research institutions and various stakeholder groups. The national follow-up network meets 4–6 times per year.

National indicators are updated once a year, during the second and third quarter. Annual update of data is accompanied with the preparation of interpretative text for each of the ten baskets. Interpretative texts are prepared by experts of different ministries and research institutions. The purpose of interpretative texts is to describe the current state and recent development.

In recent years, Finland has aimed to gradually improve the transparency of **sustainable development in the State Budget** by incorporating sustainable development as an integral part of its drafting process. in this process, one of the principles of development has been to progress gradually, increasing information step by step and partly on an experimental basis while assessing which model would work best for Finland. This gradual approach has made it possible to review the sustainable development budget with quite limited administrative resources. However, it is still too early to assess its impact. Nevertheless, it is already fair to say that the process has raised awareness about sustainable development issues, increased the transparency of budget proposals and helped outline the appropriations included in the proposals as a whole. Sustainable development budgeting has been specifically carried out under the leadership of the Ministry of Finance working in cooperation with other ministries. One of the key aspects of this work has involved cooperation between budget drafters and sustainable development experts.

National Commission on the Era of the SDGs

Finland has a long tradition in engaging the civil society and other stakeholders in the sustainable development work. The key mechanism for this has been the **National Commission for Sustainable Development (NCSD)**, which has operated continuously since 1993 under Prime Minister's leadership. The National Commission is a high-level multi-stakeholder forum that includes the key actors of the Finnish society. It is based on a unique hybrid model, combining high-level political leadership with wide ranging participation by civil society and other societal actors. The mission of the commission is to anchor sustainable development into Finnish policies, measures, budgets and action.

The work of NCSD is supported by a **scientific expert panel (Expert Panel for Sustainable Development**). The first panel was set up in December 2013 as an experiment by the Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra. In 2019, the coordination of the panel was moved from Sitra to the Helsinki Institute of Sustainability Science, together with the Natural Resources Institute of Finland and the Finnish Environment Institute. These three organisations, all highly engaged in sustainability research and implementation of SDGs, now share the coordination of the panel. In 2019 new members were selected to the panel, and now the panel consists of ten active scientists from different disciplines**.** Together they bring economic, social, technological, ecological and cultural viewpoints to the work of the panel. Through a constructive dialogue, the panel acts by challenging both the policy making and public debate. The panel seeks collaboration with other science panels of Finland, the Climate Panel and Nature Panel, and also with similar panels across the Europe.

In practice, the panel may participate in debates in which sustainability is discussed: in parliamentary committees; within academia, in schools, in open seminars and workshops; in events organised by private companies and in the media. During autumn 2019 the panel analysed the future pathways of the Finnish Sustainable Development Policy using the framework of six entry points and four levers introduced by the Global Sustainable Development Report (GSDR2019).

In entering the era of the 2030 Agenda, Finland's national sustainability work was guided by a national strategy from 2013. This 2013 strategy, labelled as **The Finland we want 2050 – A society's commitment to sustainable development**, consisted of eight national goals and a mechanism for engaging different actors from Finnish society into sustainability work through

operational commitments. By making an operational commitment, the actor commit itself to doing its part in attaining the eight national goals set by the Commission. The **operational commitments** include concrete measures, changes in operating procedures and innovative trials that promote the shared objectives and that can be carried out in 1 to 10 years. Through these concrete commitments, operators can take part in the promotion of all or just some of the shared objectives both in Finland and globally. By making a commitment, the actors participate in the national implementation of both, the global 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and 'Society's Commitment to Sustainable Development – Finland We Want 2050'. All the commitments are available to the public in the Sitoumus2050.fi online platform.

When the 2030 Agenda was approved in September 2015, the Commission decided to **update Society's Commitment to Sustainable Development, in order to align it with the principles, Goals and targets of Agenda 2030.** The update was based on extensive participation by the Finnish National Commission on Sustainable Development, an expert panel and the coordination network between ministries. The guiding principle in the update was that the principles, Goals and targets of Agenda 2030 should be integrated into the Society's Commitment. The global dimension and responsibility were identified as the key updating requirements: the members of the Commission emphasised global interdependence as a phenomenon that cuts across a range of objectives. The update aligned Society's Commitment to Sustainable Development fairly well with the 2030 Agenda.

In 2017 **a 2030 Agenda Youth Group** was established on the initiative of the then Vice-Chair of the Commission. Young people's involvement in implementing sustainable development policy had been found too limited, to the extent that appointing a single youth delegate for sustainable development was not enough to address the issue. The Youth Group has two roles: 1) to spur the Finnish National Commission on Sustainable Development in its work and to bring young people's voices to sustainable development policy processes and public debate; 2) to inform other young people of the Sustainable Development Goals and themes in their various networks, such as schools and leisure activities. The Agenda 2030 Youth Group consists of around 10 members aged 15 to 30, living all over the country. Group members are selected by Finnish Youth Cooperation Allianssi. The group started its fourth term in August 2021.

Right from the start, it has been important for the Youth Group to have sufficient autonomy on what they will do and what matters they will promote. Members of the group participate in the work of the Commission, and are actively involved as speakers and participants in the central government's sustainable development policy processes. The group also plays an active role as a participant in public dialogue. Chairs and members of the Youth Group participate in various stakeholder events, give interviews to the media and produce content for their social media channels.

The **Commission was re-appointed for a new four-year term in February 2020**. Prime Minister of Finland, Ms. Sanna Marin, is leading the work of the Commission and its 57 members that come from all spheres of the society. During its new term, the Commission is tasked to speed up the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

In 2021, the Commission has initiated the preparation of **national roadmap for the 2030 Agenda**. The preparation of such roadmap is included in the program of the Government, and in December 2020 the Government assigned this task to the Commission, in order to ensure the engagement of a wide range of actors. The Commission has been working on the road map for the whole 2021, and

the roadmap is due to be published in the spring 2022. The 2030 Agenda Roadmap is a plan for how Finnish society as a whole can achieve all of the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. It is based on a systemic approach, in the spirit of the Global Sustainable Development Report 2019, and addresses need for systemic change in areas such as e.g. the food system, the energy system, the use of land and forests to strengthen biodiversity and carbon neutrality, and an economy that promotes wellbeing, work and sustainable consumption.

Chapter 7

Lessons from the REN21 Global Renewable Energy Community of Actors from Science, Governments, NGOs, and Industry

Lea Ranalder, Project Manager and Analyst, Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21)

REN 21 is the only global renewable energy multi-stakeholder community. It is a community of over two thousand members who cooperate with us on collecting data and information and changing the norms and debate on what is necessary to change to achieve the energy transition. You might ask why is all of this necessary. Why do we even need to speak with different people? And why do we need to connect and build bridges and so on?

We have seen that we now have good data when it comes to renewables. This was not always the case. That said, if you look at the data we do have, it is mainly on electricity and not necessarily on heating and cooling and transport. To see where we stand on renewables in these latter sectors, we need to understand how to bring together different people that all can bring different data points to paint a complete picture of what's happening when it comes to the energy transition. Just as a practical example, we have been working a lot with cities and their data is often outdated. It's not consolidated. This makes it really difficult to understand where cities stand in the energy transition, their rate of progress, and what they need in order to advance faster.

REN21 is focused on collaboration for the energy transition. We are the only global renewable energy multi-stakeholder community that brings together stakeholders from governments, NGOs, science and academia, intergovernmental organizations, and industry associations.

To provide another practical example, off-grid renewables are often not captured in international statistics. This means we don't yet have a very good understanding of how the sector is developing. It's changing slowly, but there's really a need to bring together different puzzle pieces of that picture.

Renewable Energy in Total Final Energy Consumption by Final Energy Use, 2018

Heating and Cooling 51% — 10.2% Renewable energy
Transport 32% — 3.4% Renewable energy
Power 17% — 27.1% Renewable energy

Note: Data should not be compared with previous years because of revisions due to improved or adjusted methodology.
Source: Based on IEA data.

REN21 builds up this decentralized system of intelligence – from graduate students to CEOs. This is why we also can be quite responsive in this rapidly changing environment.

One of the biggest lessons from this from this community has always been how we should speak about renewables. Much of the conversation around renewables focuses on how they can help

address greenhouse gas emissions and tackle climate change, but that is not the only opportunity that renewables provide. For example, if you speak to people in cities, addressing air pollution is a major concern. Using renewables to address air pollution has been a big driver for change. And of course, the deaths from air pollution have also put pressure on city governments, as well as national governments, to address air pollution and health concerns and improve the public's well-being.

We've seen lots of change and action when it comes to renewables. But of course, depending on where you are in the world, renewables have also provided opportunities to promote local economic development and local job creation, improve energy access, and address energy insecurity, poverty, and sovereignty.

Bringing together a wide variety of people helps us understand how to build bridges between different communities and the arguments we need to use when we're speaking about renewables and what kind of benefits they can bring. We need a variety of stakeholders. We often hear about the record level of renewable installations, cost reductions, bigger plans, more installations, etc.. However, most of these advances are in the power sector where renewables are strong. We consume more than 80 percent of our energy in heating, cooling, and transport, and that's where renewables are lagging behind. Most of the policy support and targets are being set in the power sector, so there's a disconnect between where we use most of our energy and where most of the attention is located. We need to put more focus on heating, cooling, and transport.

Estimated Renewable Share of Total Final Energy Consumption
2009 and 2019

Exajoules (EJ)

8.7%
11.0% Others
80.3% Fossil fuels

Modern renewables

11.2%
8.7% Others
80.2% Fossil fuels

The share of fossil fuels in final energy demand barely changed over one decade.

2009   2019

Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding. This figure shows a comparison between two years across a 10-year span. The result of the economic recession in 2008 may have temporarily lowered the share of fossil fuels in total final energy consumption in 2009. The share in 2008 was 80.7%.
Source: Based on IEA data.

This is where we see a need to for a multi-level collaboration and multi-sector collaboration. For example, when it comes to heating and cooling, local governments play a really important role because heating and cooling mostly involve buildings and building demand is quite decentralised. There is a need to build up local markets. City governments have an important role to play in shifting to renewable based transport and reducing overall energy demand by improving walkability. We've seen businesses taking a lead in trying to shift to more renewable transportation. We've also seen a major shift and push for electric vehicles from both businesses and cities thinking about how they can link the scaling up of electric vehicles with the increasing renewable electricity supply.

One of the biggest findings from the report we launched in early 2021 is that the share of fossil fuels in total energy consumption has pretty much stayed the same over the previous decade. There has been an increase in renewables which now accounts for 11.2 percent in energy demand, but there's also been an increase in energy demand over the last 10 years. We need to think about how we can reduce energy demand and decouple economic growth and energy demand by scaling up energy efficiency solutions. Of course, we must complement these energy efficiency solutions with the

scaling up of renewables, but the irony is we are still stuck there. Fossil fuels received over $500 billion of direct subsidies in 2019, while total investment in renewables was around $300 billion. If we look at COVID-19 recovery packages around the world, six times as much has been invested in fossil fuels than in renewables.

Cities Recognise Renewables as an Opportunity

Cities are stepping up and taking action to accelerate renewables and and highlight renewables as an opportunity to create more livable urban environments.

There's now more than one billion people that live in a city with either a renewable energy target or policy. We've seen cities committing to renewable energy, passing net-zero targets, setting electric vehicle targets, divesting from fossil fuels, and declaring climate emergencies as steps to make the energy transition happen. Cities have been exploring ways to scale up renewables in their own operations and get their residents engaged in the energy transition.

We can only measure what we can track. It is important to gather the best data possible so we can build on the different entry points renewables can provide. We need this collaboration at the city level and at the national level; we need businesses, we need industry, we need citizens. We need everybody to be engaged in this transition and work together to make it happen.

Chapter 8

How Africa is Addressing Climate Change, the Green Energy Transition, and Governance

Albert Butare, Ph.D., former Minister of State for Infrastructure in the Republic of Rwanda

In the formulation of the 2030 Agenda, it is recognized that the greatest global challenge facing our world today is to eradicate the substantial gaps in access to resources – in economic, social, and environmental dimensions – which to a large extent contribute to sustainable development

This chapter was originally written when the G7 Heads of State were meeting in the UK in June 2021 to address climate change and the green energy transition which should be at the heart of any recovery packages from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Respecting human rights is key in shaping pandemic responses. Putting human rights and people center stage results in better outcomes in beating the pandemic, ensuring healthcare for everyone, and preserving human dignity.

Recently the UN Secretary-General urged governments to be transparent, responsive, and accountable in their COVID-19 response and ensure that any emergency measures are legal, proportionate, necessary, and non-discriminatory. He said:

> "The best response is one that responds proportionately to immediate threats while protecting human rights and the rule of law."

He also noted this was not happening with the distribution of the current vaccine.

Cognizant of the fact that fewer than 10 years remain to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) globally, there is a growing need to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of action by targeting multiple SDGs by considering their symbiotic nature. The SDGs were conceived as an 'indivisible whole,' but interactions between SDGs need to be better understood. Efforts focusing on the environmentally-focused SDGs in underpinning sustainable development should also focus on environment–human linkages. Therefore, assessing interactions between SDGs and the influence of environment on them can make an important contribution to informing present and future decisions. For instance, the interaction between SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions), SDG 13 (Climate Change) and SDG 7 (Green Energy Transition) is important to consider, among several others. Interaction between the 16 thematic SDGs to help deliver on our climate change goals is critical.

The G7 green energy transition path is part of this solution. The assessment enables decision-makers to focus to identify opportunities to build on synergies and reduce trade-offs between particular SDGs. It may also enable central and sectoral decision-makers to seek support from environment managers for achieving their goals. The 17 SDGs and their targets present a new and coherent way of thinking about diverse issues related to development, such as hunger, gender, and climate change, and were conceived as "integrated and indivisible to balance the three dimensions of sustainable development: the economic, social and environmental" (UN 2015).

Progress towards the SDGs depends on action by national governments and a wide range of actors, including the private sector, civil society organizations, and millions of individuals. Coordinated governance that recognizes and provides importance to all these stakeholders becomes critical in achieving the SDGs.

Commonly, decisions and actions (including research, innovation, policy, and management) are mostly focused on a single SDG, or small subsets of SDGs, because institutions, governance, and research funders are commonly fragmented or siloed (e.g., separate agriculture and climate change departments; water resources management and energy, etc.). Governments may also prioritize those SDGs that can in principle be met at the national scale, especially goals related to human wellbeing (e.g. SDGs 1, 3, 4, 5, 10, 16; Waage et al. 2015). However, because decisions and actions to advance any one SDG will likely affect the achievement of the others, we need a better understanding of the interactions between SDGs, in particular trade-offs, synergies, and unintended consequences.

Climate change does not respect borders. Therefore, cross-border concerted efforts, initiatives, and governance based on regional understanding and integration is key. For example, the Kingdom of Lesotho exports water to South Africa through the Orange River. The river is the longest within the borders of South Africa and the Orange River Basin extends from Lesotho into South Africa as well as Namibia to the north. It rises in the Drakensberg mountains in Lesotho. The river forms part of the international borders between South Africa and Lesotho and between South Africa and Namibia as well as several provincial borders within South Africa. The Orange River plays an important role in the South African economy by providing water for irrigation and hydroelectric power. This works well due to the good bilateral understanding between the two countries, but also due to the responsible water management and cross-border governance of the resource in general.

Another reason for considering interactions between SDGs is the growing evidence that substantial economic, social, and environmental benefits can be obtained from well-coordinated actions that capitalize on synergies between multiple SDGs. For example, targeting energy security (SDG 7), climate change (SDG 13), and air pollution (SDG 3, SDG 11, SDG 12) simultaneously in energy systems could achieve all three goals for only slightly greater cost than achieving the climate change goal alone (c. 1% of global GDP vs c. 1.6%; McCollum et al. 2011). Phasing out solid fuel cookstoves could significantly reduce global warming and, at the same time, prevent hundreds of thousands of deaths per year from local pollution (SDG 3, SDG 3).

As Florian Krampe puts it: building peace is never straightforward, but there is an increasing awareness that the challenge will become exponentially more difficult in countries where climate change is amplifying social and political instability. Eight of the ten countries hosting the greatest number of multilateral peace operations personnel in 2018 are located in areas highly exposed to climate change. Nonetheless, international efforts to build and maintain peace are not yet taking these emerging challenges systematically into account. This is concerning because the interactions between climate change and violent conflict prolong the latter, inhibiting peacebuilding and increasing the human costs of war.

Climate-Related Security Risks to Building Peace

Climate-related changes compound social, economic and political challenges, particularly in regions in which agriculture is an important source of livelihoods. This results in climate-related security

risks, which also means an increased likelihood of violent conflict. However, the impacts are temporally and spatially diverse, because different social, political, and economic contexts and processes are exacerbated by different climate-related changes.

The work of peace operations to build and sustain peace is becoming increasingly difficult because climate change is directly affecting the dynamics of ongoing conflicts and increasing the likelihood of violent conflict. This interaction has been seen in recent years, for example, in Somalia, but can also be found across the broader Sahel region and in other states such as Afghanistan. Somali society's double exposure to decades of violent conflict and recurring droughts and floods has generated over 2.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). Increasingly, climate-related impacts are driving displacement through land degradation linked to the greater frequency of droughts and floods. In April 2018, for instance, flash floods in Somalia affected more than 695,000 people, displacing nearly 215,000.

Green Energy Transition

The 2015 Paris Climate Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) both underline the necessity of a transition toward a sustainable, zero-carbon future for all. Since it is responsible for most of the carbon emissions, clearly the energy sector must be at the center of such an extensive shift. The question is neither whether we need this transition, nor whether it will happen, but rather whether we will achieve it fast enough to meet the 1.5°C temperature goal set by the Paris Agreement.

The global energy transition away from fossil fuels toward 100 percent renewable energy faces numerous challenges. Speed will be essential to avoid irreversible damage. Further challenges such as energy access, energy storage, technology transfer, enabling investment, the vested interests of the fossil industry, and the effects on the labor market must be addressed quickly. In order to be successful, the transition has to be socially inclusive and just, leaving no one behind.

Even though the global energy transition represents an enormous challenge, calling for efforts from all of us, we should not only focus on the difficulties and risks, but more importantly also on the manifold opportunities it brings with it. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), renewable energy has huge potential in terms of job creation. Jobs in the renewable energy sector are created directly and indirectly along the entire value chain. If we ensure that these jobs have decent working conditions in terms of health, salaries, and benefits, then they can be clearly preferable to jobs in the traditional energy sector. Because renewable energy sources can be installed and used in a decentralized way, they can bring access to energy to everybody, including rural areas, which is important for sustainable development from which everyone can profit.

In addition, renewable energy leads to cleaner air and a healthier environment, so it not only saves lives but also reduces expenditures in public healthcare costs. A 100 per-cent renewable energy future is our only chance to achieve both the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement and the SDGs. The global energy transition is affecting everybody. We should thus all be involved in shaping it. But how exactly can we all shape it? The principle that unites every movement and every stakeholder active in this process is justice. But what does justice mean in the context of the energy transition away from fossil fuels toward renewable energy sources? How can we unite the different approaches to justice from trade unions that rightfully insist that workers' rights be respected, to development

groups that rightfully stress the importance of rapidly eradicating poverty, to environmental groups that rightfully underline the importance of respecting planetary boundaries?

The key – and this quickly becomes very clear – is to build bridges, not walls. Different groups must combine their efforts to support a just global energy transition that is already well underway. 2016 marked the first year in which global investments in renewable energy were higher than those in fossil fuels – especially in the Global South. The Climate Vulnerable Forum's (CVF) announcement during COP 22 in Marrakesh on wanting to achieve 100 percent renewable energy by 2050 at the latest is a positive sign regarding where the world is and should be heading. This path needs to be accelerated and strengthened by an alliance of developing countries, developed countries, civil society, trade unions, scientists, and business.

In order to be successful, this transition has to be socially inclusive and just, leaving no one behind.

Chapter 9

Did COP 26 Save the World? An Assessment of the Outcomes of the 26th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change[ii]

Ambassador Franz Xaver Perrez, Head of the International Affairs Division at the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN) and the Swiss Ambassador for the Environment

Climate change is clearly one of the biggest challenges humanity faces today.[iii] The science is clear,[iv] the facts are alarming,[v] and the policies and measures adopted by the international community are still inadequate.[vi] Current policies would lead to a global warming by the end of this century of 2.8°C (range 2.3–3.3°C)[vii] – this is far more than the goal of well below 2° Celsius or 1.5° Celsius agreed upon in the Paris Agreement.[viii] The 26th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 26), which took place October 31 to November 12 2021 in Glasgow,[ix] was seen by many as the moment to deliver the needed changes to keep global temperature increase below 1.5°. The expectations for COP 26 were high. However, while the result of COP 26 was hailed by some as a big success, it was criticized by others as "blablabla."[x] This chapter will first compare these expectations with the functions of a Conference of Parties (COP). It will then identify the success criteria for COP 26 and look at the outcomes of COP 26 through the lenses of these criteria. It will conclude that COP 26 was indeed an important and successful step in the longer process, that it was able to solve some of the urgent issues, but forwarded others to the COP 27 in Sharm el-Sheikh and beyond.

Expectations for COP 26 in Glasgow and Functions of a COP

COP 26, initially scheduled for November 2020, had to be postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.[xi] The previous UN Climate Change Conference, COP 25 in Madrid, was not able to deliver on several of the expected outcomes. Namely, it was not able to adopt the remaining elements of the Paris Rulebook (i.e., the rules needed to implement Art. 6 of the Paris Agreement on carbon markets). The work on transparency concluded in Madrid without any result.[xii] Moreover, while the Parties to the Paris Agreement were mandated to communicate or update their Nationally Determined Contribution (NDCs) in 2020, most Parties failed to do so.[xiii] These NDCs should have reflected the efforts by States to keep the global average temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and ensured that the global average temperature is kept to well below 2 °C. Finally, with the postponement of COP 26 by one year, it was envisaged that COP 26 would not only deliver on its mandate for 2020, but also on all the mandates that were scheduled for 2021.[xiv] This should prevent a delay in the global efforts to combat climate change. Ambition for and pressure on COP 26 were thus big.

In the broader public, the expectations for COP 26 were even bigger. Many felt that COP 26 would be the last moment to save the world from the impacts of climate change. Slogans such as "change the politics and not the climate" expressed the expectation that COP 26 would deliver commitments by States to enhance their national mitigation policies to bring the international community on a 1.5° pathway. Specific expectations were, for example, that all countries submit "stronger 2030 targets

aligned with 1.5°,"[xv] that COP 26 should "consign coal to history,"[xvi] that it should deliver "a faster, fair, and sustainable energy transition to a 100% renewable energy by 2040,"[xvii] "increased finance for climate action,"[xviii] and the establishment of "a robust financing system for loss and damage within UNFCCC."[xix] Compared with these expectations, COP 26 was not a success.[xx]

Not all of these expectations seem to relate to the traditional functions of a COP. The COP is the intergovernmental meeting where the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, to the Kyoto Protocol and to the Paris Agreement come together to take decisions and formulate guidance on the implementation of these three instruments. Its mandate is to keep under regular review the implementation of the Convention and to make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote its effective implementation.[xxi] This includes activities such as to examine the obligations of the Parties and the institutional arrangements, to promote and facilitate the exchange of information, to promote the development of methodologies and to consider and adopt reports.[xxii] However, according to the Paris Agreement, the COP does not have the mandate nor the authority to adopt legally binding emission reduction targets or financial obligations for Parties, or to take legally binding decisions such as adopting a ban on coal or other fossil energy sources. Most importantly, the national climate change targets and policies that finally determine the ambition of global climate action are not formulated at the COPs, but in the capitals before or after the COPs. Thus, many of the expectations that were not fulfilled by COP 26 were expectations that the COP as such cannot fulfill. However, the COP can provide the framework that enables, motivates and commits the Parties to adopt and implement the policies needed to successfully combat climate change. And it can adopt specific legally binding rules that Parties have to respect when developing and implementing their NDC, when reporting on their national policies or when cooperating and using carbon market mechanisms to reduce global emissions. In order to assess whether COP 26 has been a success or not, the outcome has to be measured against these functions and competences of the COP.

Success Criteria for COP 26

The Environmental Integrity Group, one of the four formal negotiation groups in the climate change process, has stated at the beginning of COP 26 that "success at this COP will be measured by the strength of our outcomes in three areas: Rules, Finance, and Ambition."[xxiii] The other negotiation groups formulated similar expectations around these three success criteria, while highlighting the areas where they had a specific interest. Thus, the Group of 77 and China, while also formulating the expectation that COP 26 will deliver on rules, finance and ambition, underlined specifically the need for increased finance and the need to enhance support to address adaptation and loss and damage.[xxiv] The Umbrella Group, while similarly indicating that COP 26 has to deliver on rules, finance and ambition, stressed specifically the need to complete the outstanding work on the enhanced transparency framework and the rules governing carbon markets under the Paris Agreement, by which Parties can realize part of their emissions reductions abroad.[xxv] And the EU, the fourth formal negotiation group, emphasized that while working for ambition, finance and rules, "we have to listen to science."[xxvi]

COP 26 clearly had to deliver on rules: The Climate Change Conference in 2018 in Katowice was supposed to adopt the "Paris Rulebook," i.e. the rules providing the further guidance needed for Parties to implement the Paris Agreement. Katowice however was not able to adopt the rules to implement Art. 6, and while adopting the core elements of the transparency framework, it mandated

COP 26 to agree on the detailed reporting modalities and tables. COP 25 in Madrid, however, was again not able to agree on the outstanding rules on Art. 6 and was unable to prepare a draft text on detailed guidance on transparency. COP 26 therefore had to finalize these outstanding items of the Paris Rulebook. Thereby, in order to be successful, not any outcome was acceptable, but "ambitious decisions that accelerate Paris Agreement implementation" were expected.[xxvii] This meant the adoption of robust rules on Art. 6 that prevented double counting of emissions reductions and avoided the transfer of emission reductions achieved in the past under the Kyoto Protocol into the post 2020 Paris regime. With regard to transparency, it was critical that the guidance adopted at COP 26 requested robust reporting by all and especially by the biggest emitters, allowing for flexibility only for those Parties that needed such flexibility in the light of their specific capacity challenges. And finally, it was hoped that COP 26 could agree on common time frames so that all Parties would hand in future NDCs with the same end date.

With regard to finance, COP 26 faced the challenge that the objective was not met that developed countries, in the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation, would mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. This objective was formulated in 2010 at COP 16 in Cancun[xxviii] and confirmed in 2015 at COP 21 in Paris.[xxix] In order to be successful, COP 26 had to find a constructive way forward to address this deficit. Moreover, it was agreed that COP 26 should initiate the deliberations on setting a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency of implementation and taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries.[xxx] Launching these deliberations in a solution-oriented manner and agreeing on a process that will be able to develop an ambitious collective new post 2025 finance goal was another success factor for COP 26.

Finally with regard to ambition, after the failure of Parties to the Paris Agreement to submit new enhanced mitigation targets that would together have been able to reduce global emissions sufficiently to reach the objective of the Paris Agreement, COP 26 had to take the decisions needed to keep the 1.5° objective within reach. Keeping 1.5° within reach was the third success criteria for COP 26.

Thus, in order to be successful, COP 26 had to deliver 1st the completion of the Paris Rulebook, 2nd progress on finance and 3rd the ambition needed to keep 1.5° within reach. These three success criteria directly relate to the core functions of the COP to formulate the guidance needed to implement the Paris Agreement, to provide the framework that enables, motivates and commits Parties to implement the needed policies and to strengthen their respective commitments.

Key Outcomes of COP 26

As every COP, the Glasgow Climate Change Conference did adopt numerous decisions ranging from very political issues such as the Glasgow Climate Pact[xxxi] to very technical decisions such as the decision on modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 7, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement.[xxxii] While each of these decisions are important, the success of the COP will have to be assessed by focusing on the decisions relating to success criteria, namely the conclusion of the Paris Rulebook, finance and ambition. From an overall perspective, the three criteria for success have been met: 1st, the remaining elements of the Paris Rulebook were

adopted, 2nd a robust process to develop a new collective finance goal for the time after 2025 was launched, and 3rd the Glasgow Climate Pact adopted several elements to keep the 1.5° objective in reach.

Paris Rulebook: Transparency, Implementation Rules on Art. 6, and Common Timeframes

With the adoption of the robust decisions on transparency, Art. 6 and common time frames, the Glasgow Climate Conference was able to fill the remaining gaps of the Paris Rulebook. The transparency rules, often referred to as "backbone of the Paris Agreement,"[xxxiii] establish the same robust reporting guidelines and tables for all Parties with flexibility for those who need such flexibility in the light of their capacity.[xxxiv] The rules on Art. 6 prevent double counting between different Nationally Determined Contributions.[xxxv] And, the Glasgow decisions encourage Parties to the Paris Agreement to communicate starting from 2025 nationally determined contributions with common end dates.[xxxvi] It is interesting to note that while all Parties agreed that the implementation rules on transparency and Art. 6 would be legally binding, there were divergent views whether the COP has the authority to take a binding decision on common time frame. While some argued that Art. 4.10 of the Paris Agreement did only mandate the COP to "consider common time frames" but did not establish the authority of the COP to take binding decisions,[xxxvii] others referred to Art. 4.9 which clearly establishes the authority of the COP to adopt binding decisions for the communication of nationally determined contributions.[xxxviii] By encouraging Parties to use common time frames for all future NDCs, a compromise was found between those who argued for a binding decision for all future NDCs, and those who argued for a non-binding recommendation only for the next NDC. "Agreement on common time frames was clearly one of Glasgow's success stories."[xxxix] Synchronizing the end-years of NDCs will facilitate taking stock of the collective overall ambition of NDCs, and agreeing on 5-year will facilitate momentum to regularly increase the ambition of NDCs.

The Environmental Integrity of the Implementation Rules on Art. 6 (market mechanisms)

The decision adopted on the implementation of Art. 6 deserves closer scrutiny: Art. 6 of the Paris Agreement establishes the possibility that emission reductions achieved through voluntary cooperation in one Party can be used by another Party towards the achievement of its NDC. This possibility to transfer and trade emission reductions should create an incentive for additional emission reductions. While the Paris Agreement established the key principles of such market mechanisms, Parties were not able to agree on the implementation rules at COP 24 in Katowice nor at COP 25 in Madrid. Therefore, the pressure to achieve agreement on this important outstanding issue at COP 26 in Glasgow was big.

In the lead-up to COP 26, many Parties were concerned that this pressure could lead to the adoption of implementation rules on Art. 6 with loopholes which would undermine the efforts to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement. In Paris, Art. 6 was adopted to allow Parties to achieve "higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions."[xl] It was feared that implementation rules with loopholes that do not live up to high standards of environmental integrity would not lead to an increase of ambition, but rather undermine ambition. Several of the proposals made during the negotiations would indeed have created important loopholes. One such loophole would have been the possibility for "double counting," whereby the same emission reduction would be accounted twice,

once by the "host country" where the emissions reductions are realized, and once by the "buyer country" who is financing the emission reduction. Other loopholes would have been allowing setting of non-robust baselines at business-as-usual levels, or accepting a large carry-over of emission reductions achieved in the past under the Kyoto Protocol into the Paris Agreement framework.

It was unclear until the last moments of COP 26 whether a robust and ambitious outcome was achievable or whether the conference risked another no-deal scenario as at COP 24 and COP 25. For years, double counting avoidance had been a most contentious issue in the negotiations. While the overwhelming majority of Parties wanted rules requiring for all internationally transferred emission reductions a "corresponding adjustment," the accounting approach to avoid double counting, Brazil insisted that such a corresponding adjustment should not apply to all activities under Article 6. In the lead-up to COP 26, it proposed as a compromise a grace period of 10 years during which corresponding adjustment would not have had to fully be applied.[xli] Finally, during COP26, Brazil, supported by the US, proposed as a "final" compromise an approach that would not have required a corresponding adjustment for emission reductions that were used by private actors. This would have allowed the same emission reductions to be used both by a Party towards the achievement of its NDC and a private actor towards the achievement of its voluntary emission reduction targets. This would have led to significant double claiming of emissions reductions, especially given the vast interest of private actors to offset their emissions. It would also have led to erosion of trust in the carbon markets, namely of the private sector claims. During the Presidency's Stocktaking Session of November 10, Switzerland on behalf of the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), supported by the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Norway and Canada, rejected this proposal and insisted on full accounting, i.e. that double counting has to be prohibited between all uses of emission reductions.[xlii] These Parties insisted that the rules should ensure that the same emission reduction can only be used either by a Party for its NDC achievement, or for other international mitigation purposes such as for the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), or by the voluntary private carbon market for achievement of voluntary climate neutrality goal. In order to find a compromise between the different positions, Switzerland and the USA developed a proposal that would have prevented double counting between use for NDC achievements and use for voluntary private carbon markets by clarifying that all emission reductions to be used for mitigation purposes would require a corresponding adjustment. The support of emission reductions where the host country does not apply corresponding adjustment would lead to a support claim, but not to a claim that could be used for any mitigation purposes.[xliii] The decision that was finally adopted at COP 26 did not take up the proposal that the use of emission reductions achieved under Art. 6.4 for the voluntary carbon market would not require a corresponding adjustment. Nor did it take up the compromise proposal developed by Switzerland and the US. On the contrary, the rules adopted at COP 26 require full accounting with corresponding adjustment for all emission reductions authorized for the use towards NDCs, towards international mitigation purposes such as the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) established under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and towards other international mitigation purposes such as the voluntary private carbon market.[xliv] However, no guidance was adopted for the unauthorized use of emission reductions. It is not clear whether "unauthorized" emission reductions could be internationally transferred by the voluntary private carbon market. If unauthorized use were permitted at all, this would need further clarification.

Moreover, the implementation rules on Art. 6 adopted in Glasgow follow also in other areas the objective of environmental integrity: they provide for robust and conservative baseline setting,[xlv] for guidance for the transparent and representative conversion of cooperation in non-greenhouse gas metrics into tCO2e (tons of CO2 equivalent),[xlvi] and for environmental and social safeguards[xlvii] combined with a grievance mechanism.[xlviii] And, projects under the Cleaner Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol can only continue under the Paris Agreement if they meet the Art. 6 requirements, including corresponding adjustment.[xlix]

However, in Glasgow Parties decided to allow a carry-over of over 349 Mt of CO2 of past emission reductions achieved under the Kyoto Protocol into the post 2020 Paris regime.[l] This is a disappointment as it could create a loophole for the amount of more than 7 year of the total emissions of a country like Switzerland. This is clearly a contradiction to the ambition and the objectives of the Paris Agreement. However, several Parties like Switzerland, Japan or the European Union have clearly announced that they would not use emission reductions achieved under the Kyoto Protocol for the fulfillment of their emission reduction target under the Paris Agreement. In fact, no country has so far announced that it would do so, and no NDCS foresees the use of carry over. Thus, in benchmarking against the expectations, the adoption of Article 6 rules that ensure environmental integrity in almost all areas aside from a theoretical carry-over of emission reductions achieved under the Kyoto Protocol is a true success.

Finance

On finance, the Conference adopted a solution-oriented and inclusive process to develop a new collective finance goal for the period after 2025 that ensures a balanced engagement of the political level, the technical level and relevant institutions and actors from outside of the UNFCCC regime.[li] Developed countries increased their pledges towards the 100 billion goal and the Conference was able to welcome a Climate Finance Delivery Plan, which showed how developed countries intend to achieve the 100 billion goal.[lii] And with regard to adaptation finance, the Conference urged developed country Parties to at least double by 2025 their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties from 2019 levels.[liii]

Ambition

With regard ambition, the COP adopted a Glasgow Climate Pact with several elements that make sure that the 1.5° objective is kept within reach. As a starting point, it reaffirmed the Paris Agreement temperature goal to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels,[liv] and it recognized that this will require "rapid, deep sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions, including reducing global carbon dioxide emissions by 45 per cent by 2030 relative to the 2010 level and to net zero around midcentury, as well as deep reductions in other greenhouse."[lv] It then decided to develop a work programme to scale up mitigation ambition and implementation.[lvi] The Glasgow Climate Pact requests Parties to revisit and strengthen their 2030 mitigation targets as necessary by the end of 2022 to align with the Paris Agreement temperature goal,[lvii] and to formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies towards just transition to net zero emissions by or around mid-century.[lviii]

Very specifically, the Glasgow Climate Change Conference also called for the first time for "accelerating efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies."[lix] Moreover, it decided to convene an annual ministerial meeting on pre 2030 ambition[lx] and invited the UN Secretary-General to convene a the world leaders in 2023 to consider ambition to 2030.[lxi] Finally, with regard to ambition, numerous initiatives by states, international organizations and private actors were launched at COP 26 with concrete actions to increase mitigation, adaptation and climate finance.[lxii]

Phasing Down Unabated Coal

While the Glasgow Climate Pact was generally praised as a success, several Parties expressed in the closing plenary their disappointment about the decision to accelerating efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power. This formulation was felt as inadequate and weak. In fact, the text presented at the stocktaking session that preceded the closing plenary included the formulation to "phase out" unabated coal. However, due to pressure from India, the word "phase out" was replaced by "phasedown."[lxiii] This triggered heavy criticism. On one hand, the change displayed a lack of political willingness to give up coal dependency. On the other hand, this last-minute change also triggered frustration as Parties were told earlier that no changes to the draft would be accepted. It was argued that any change would reopen the whole package and lead to a collapse of the COP. Switzerland, for one, was pressured not to make a proposal to address the possible loophole in the decision on Art. 6 to prevent double claiming of offset claims by private sector actors.[lxiv] The disappointment about the final language on coal is also a reflection of the lack of inclusiveness and transparency of the process in the final hours of the COP, and a reaction to expectations that were raised, including by the presidency, earlier in the process.

However, despite of this weakening of the language on coal, it has to be acknowledged that this was the first time that the COP took such a clear decision on phasing down unabated coal and phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.[lxv] Moreover, at least 23 Parties made new commitments to phase out coal power, including Chile, Egypt, Indonesia, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Spain, and Vietnam, and major international banks committed to end all international public financing of new unabated coal power.[lxvi] This is a strong signal to investors and the private carbon market that investments in coal have no future. Thus, with some distance to the changes in the final text, even the formulation on phasing down unabated coal is a positive outcome of COP 26.

Loss and Damage and Adaptation

In addition to the decision relating directly to the three success criteria, COP 26 also took important decision with regard to loss and damage and on adaptation. Thus, it further operationalized the Santiago Network on loss and damage for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage,[lxvii] it agreed on the function of the Santiago network and launched a process for further developing its institutional arrangements,[lxviii] and it decided that the Santiago network will be provided with funds to support technical assistance to avert, minimize and address loss and damage.[lxix] And with regard to adaptation, COP 26 launched a comprehensive two-year Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme to further operationalize the global goal on adaptation.[lxx]

Was COP 26 a Real Success or a Pretentious Illusion?

Based on this assessment of its key outcomes, COP 26 seems to have been a real success. The three criteria for success have been met: 1st, the remaining elements of the Paris Rulebook were adopted. 2nd, a robust process to develop a new collective finance goal for the time after 2025 was launched. And 3rd, the Glasgow Climate Pact included several ambitious elements that ensure that the 1.5° objective is kept within reach. Moreover, the decisions taken in Glasgow also brought forward the adaptation agenda and strengthened the arrangement on loss and damage.

At the same time, it is also clear that COP 26 did not solve all the issues that need to be addressed in order to successfully address the global challenge of climate change. In fact, COP 26 postponed important decisions to later in the process. On mitigation, COP 26 was not able to bring the international community on a 1.5° pathway, but to keep the 1.5° objective only "alive." By launching the work to develop a work programme on mitigation on which a decision will have to be taken at the next climate change conference[lxxi] and by requesting Parties to revisit and strengthen their emission reduction targets by the end of 2022,[lxxii] COP 26 in fact put the burden to deliver on the 1.5° objective on COP 27. Similarly, COP 26 also forwarded details on the implementation of Art. 6 to the next COP.[lxxiii] The next COP will also have to adopt the decisions on the further development of the institutional arrangements of the Santiago Network on loss and damage.[lxxiv] Glasgow thus turned mitigation, the remaining elements of Art. 6 and the institutional arrangement of the Santiago Network on loss and damage into key success factors for COP 27.

COP 26 also launched important work which will have to deliver at COP 28 and later: While COP 27 will give further guidance on the comprehensive two-year Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation, the work programme is supposed to deliver only at COP 28.[lxxv] It will be only COP 29 in 2024 that has to agree on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance.[lxxvi]

COP 26 took important decisions. It did so especially with regard to the Paris Rulebook, where postponement was not an option. In fact, the Paris Agreement has become operational on 1st of January 2021 and the last outstanding rules, modalities and guidance for its implementation were urgently needed. At the same time, COP 26 forwarded critical issues on mitigation, adaptation and finance for resolution to the next COPs. COP 26 was thus an important step in a longer process. It solved the issues that could be solved and directed the processes for solving others in the future. Therefore, we will be able to assess fully whether COP 26 was indeed a real success or only a pretentious illusion in the future when we see how the processes initiated at COP 26 will deliver. COP 26 did thus not save the planet, but it contributed to it. This is in line with the functions of a COP: individual COPs are not the moment to save the planet, but to bring us step by step towards progress. COPs ensure that the institutional framework and the political environment is in place that helps countries to deliver what is needed to save the planet together. At the end, it will be the Parties and not the COP that will solve the problems of climate change.

Note: please refer to the back of the book for chapter citations.

Chapter 10

Outcomes from the Glasgow Climate Summit

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The UN Paris Climate Agreement in 2015 had the goal that the world would aim at limiting warming to 1.5° Celsius or well below 2° Celsius by the end of the century. To enable a review of progress, countries were asked to submit their new National Determined Contributions (NDCs) by the Glasgow Climate Summit in 2020.

Due to COVID-19, the Glasgow Summit was postponed from November 2020 to November 2021 and by doing so enabled an in-person event. The impact of COVID had converted a one-year process to a two-year process. In those two years in the run-up to the Glasgow Climate Summit, it became clear that progress on the climate negotiation agenda was going to be difficult. In particular, due to the lack of any in-person event in 2020 and a virtual event rather than an in-person event in June 2021 for the preparatory session for Glasgow. These June meetings are critical as they prepare the ground for that year's summit. In particular, they convene the two subsidiary bodies. The first is the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) is at the heart of all implementation issues under the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement. The second is the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) which provides timely information and advice on scientific and technological matters as they relate to the Convention, its Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement. In key areas such as agriculture there was no advancement at all, and these will now have to be addressed in June 2022 in preparation for COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh Egypt.

Face-to-face meeting are the bedrock for understanding the positions different countries take and building trust among 193 countries. On the positive side, the postponement did give more time to put pressure on governments to submit their updated NDC. It also enabled more time for governments to increase their contribution to the $100 billion mark. This figure had been proposed by Hillary Clinton at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit for helping developing countries to address their mitigation and adaptation plans.

On top of this huge agenda was much that had been left unresolved from the previous 2019 Madrid Climate Summit. In particular, what is known as Article 6 deals with the approach to carbon markets. The 2015 Paris Climate Summit had established a stakeholder commitment approach to the issue of addressing climate change. For the first-time, there was a real attempt to seek commitments from stakeholders on what they would do to help address climate change.

The UK presidency built on this and launched a number of stakeholder and government partnerships to accelerate the commitments on reducing greenhouse gasses. Let's look at some of the key outcomes from Glasgow.

Financial Commitment

Countries committed under the Copenhagen Accord in 2009 to be contributing at least $100 billion a year for climate mitigation and adaptation by 2020 to help developing countries address climate

change largely created by developed countries. This was then enshrined in the Paris Climate Agreement in 2015.

By the time of the Glasgow Climate Summit, the $100 billion had not been reached and expectations were that it wouldn't until 2023. Of those committed something like 80% were loans and only 20% was going to the most impacted those from the Least Developed Countries (LDC).

There is still work to be done in fulfilling that commitment, not least from the United States which has not paid enough while Japan and France have paid more than their fair share. The United States contributions were complicated by the Trump years when the US withdrew from the UNFCCC. The Biden Administration rejoined the UNFCCC, but the United States still hasn't adequately compensated for the money they should have contributed and didn't during those years. The Biden Administration has promised that they would nearly double their contribution by 2024. However, given they need congressional approval for this and the Democrats are likely to lose at least the House if not also the Senate in 2022, this is unlikely to be realized.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has estimated that we need trillions, not billions. It has suggested that this would be in the range of $1.6 trillion to $3.8 trillion would be needed annually to avoid exceeding 1.5° Celsius of warming. It is important to note that this would not just come from governments, but the private sector as well.

In contrast, governments in 2019 were still subsidizing fossil fuels to the tune of $554 billion a year (Timperley, 2021). The African Group in September 2021 called for a scaling up of funding for climate adaptation and mitigation by 2030 by more than ten-fold to $1.3 trillion from the present $100 billion (Rumney, 2021). As far as the private sector is concerned the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero and their commitments at the Glasgow Climate Summit does give a roadmap and a set of interim targets within the capital market. I will deal with them under the 'Coalitions of the Willing' below.

National Determined Contributions

To understand where we are on NDCs, it is important to examine the landscape before the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement when projected warming by the end of the century was in the region of 3° to 4° Celsius (WRI, 2021). We now know that if we are to limit warming to 1.5° Celsius, approximately 90% of coal reserves and 60% of oil and gas reserves must stay underground by 2050 (Welsby, 2021). As Glasgow approached, the report from the IPCC warned of increased warming and the need for emissions to fall by around 45% by 2030. The UN Secretary Generals went as far as to call it 'Code Red for Humanity and the Planet.' There is no question that the enormous work of activists, particularly young people, in keeping the pressure on the politicians was keeping climate change in the news and therefore on the national agenda in many important countries. Greta Thunberg, the Swedish youth activist, in October 2021 at the Milan Youth Meeting expressed young people's views when she said:

"We must find a smooth transition towards a low carbon economy. There is no Planet B," she said, in a reference to a speech given by French President Emmanuel Macron. "There is no Planet Blah. Blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah." (Dewan, 2021)

By late October 2021, around 140 countries had announced an updated National Determined Contribution. These 140 account for 57% of global emissions (WRI, 2021). In addition, 65 countries had pledged to net-zero emissions by 2050 and some – China, India, Indonesia, Russia and Saudi Arabia – by 2060.

These different dates and pledges complicate the math on where we are as far as keeping within the 1.5° Celsius or even below the 2° Celsius degree rise by the end of the century. It has been estimated that the contributions announced for NDCs and net-zero pledges would, if realized, limit the rise in temperature to 2.1° Celsius (3.8° Fahrenheit). That is a huge improvement, but promises have been made before and have remained unfufilled too often, leaving many with a skeptical attitude to these projections. One important outcome from Glasgow was that the NDCs would not be reviewed again in 5 years' time, but in one year at COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt.

Article 6

The passing of Article 6 was an important and vital achievement. It took over six years to get an agreement on a global carbon market mechanism (GCMM) as was suggested in the Paris Agreement Article 6 Rulebook. It will now enable an emission trading system to emerge and allow private capital to be directed to carbon mitigation. Projects will need to comply with a new International Supervisory Body and a set of key criteria for them to be able to be eligible for GCMM.

Projects will have to show that they are additional to what has already been logged into a countries NDC. In addition, they will have to show that it couldn't have been achieved under a 'business-as-usual' basis without additional funding. The projects must also have an effective monitoring system which can calculate emission reductions and should include ambitious benchmarking which minimize adverse environmental and social impacts and have a stakeholder consultation (Clifford Chance, 2021).

We are in early days and there are many 'cowboys' in the carbon markets that will need to be brought in line with the new Rulebook. Sharm el-Sheikh will be an important time to review progress.

Coalitions of the Willing

The climate summit negotiations cannot do everything as outcomes have to be agreed by all Member States. This can mean developments are slow, perhaps even painfully slow. The Paris Climate Agreement opened up the opportunity for stakeholders to make their own commitments. This has seen initiatives such as Race To Zero.

Race To Zero is a "global campaign to rally leadership and support from businesses, cities, regions, investors for a healthy, resilient, zero carbon recovery that prevents future threats, creates decent jobs, and unlocks inclusive, sustainable growth" (UNFCCC, 2022).

As of the Glasgow Climate Summit it mobilizes a coalition of stakeholder leading net zero initiatives, representing:

"1,049 cities, 67 regions, 5,235 businesses, 441 of the biggest investors, and 1,039 Higher Education Institutions. These 'real economy' actors join 120 countries in the largest ever alliance committed to achieving net zero carbon emissions by 2050 at the latest. Collectively these actors now cover nearly 25% global CO2 emissions and over 50% GDP." (UNFCCC, 2022)

Glasgow took the next step in seeking out coalitions of the willing, offering a space for governments and/or stakeholders to band together to develop their joint plans to address climate change. This included the Deforestation Pledge Coalition, the Global Methane Pledge, the End of Coal Coalition, the Global Energy Alliance and the Beyond Oil and Gas Coalition. In addition, we also saw over 30 sector initiatives announced.

The Deforestation Pledge: This was signed by 110 countries in Glasgow and has continued to get support at the time of writing it has 143 countries supporting it.

The pledge will strengthen shared efforts to:

- Conserve forests and other terrestrial ecosystems and accelerate their restoration;
- Facilitate trade and development policies, internationally and domestically, that promote sustainable development, and sustainable commodity production and consumption, that work to countries' mutual benefit, and that do not drive deforestation and land degradation;
- Reduce vulnerability, build resilience and enhance rural livelihoods, including through empowering communities, the development of profitable, sustainable agriculture, and recognition of the multiple values of forests, while recognising the rights of Indigenous Peoples, as well as local communities, in accordance with relevant national legislation and international instruments, as appropriate;
- Implement and, if necessary, redesign agricultural policies and programmes to incentivise sustainable agriculture, promote food security, and benefit the environment;
- Reaffirm international financial commitments and significantly increase finance and investment from a wide variety of public and private sources, while also improving its effectiveness and accessibility, to enable sustainable agriculture, sustainable forest management, forest conservation and restoration, and support for Indigenous Peoples and local communities;
- Facilitate the alignment of financial flows with international goals to reverse forest loss and degradation, while ensuring robust policies and systems are in place to accelerate the transition to an economy that is resilient and advances forest, sustainable land use, biodiversity and climate goals.

It continued with:

"We urge all leaders to join forces in a sustainable land use transition. This is essential to meeting the Paris Agreement goals, including reducing vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C and pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C, noting that the science shows further acceleration of efforts is needed if we are to collectively keep 1.5°C within reach. Together we can succeed in fighting climate change, delivering resilient and inclusive growth, and halting and reversing forest loss and land degradation." (COP26, 2021)

90.94 % of global forest lies within countries that joined the pledge.

Global Methane Pledge: The Pledge was supported by 111 countries and a number of finance institutions, intergovernmental organizations foundations and other stakeholders.

Those joining the Pledge agreed to take voluntary actions to contribute to a collective effort to reduce global methane emissions at least 30 percent from 2020 levels by 2030. This could eliminate over 0.2° Celsius warming by 2050. Unlike NDC, this is a global reduction target rather than a national reduction target.

The Global Methane Pledge

Recognizing that, in order to ensure that the global community meets the Paris Agreement goal of keeping warming well below 2 degrees C, while pursuing efforts to limit warming to 1.5 degrees C, significant methane emission reductions must be achieved globally by 2030;

Recognizing that the short atmospheric lifetime of methane means that taking action now can rapidly reduce the rate of global warming and that readily available costeffective methane emission measures have the potential to avoid over 0.2 degrees C of warming by 2050 while yielding important co-benefits, including improving public health and agricultural productivity;

Recognizing that methane accounts for 17 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions from human activities, principally from the energy, agriculture, and waste sectors, and that the energy sector has the greatest potential for targeted mitigation by 2030;

Recognizing that the mitigation potential in different sectors varies between countries and regions, and that a majority of available targeted measures have low or negative cost;

Recognizing that, to keep 1.5 degrees C within reach, methane emission reductions must complement and supplement, not replace global action to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, including from the combustion of fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas), industrial processes, and the lands sector;

Recognizing that improvements to the transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability, and consistency of methane emissions data assessed and validated in accordance with United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Paris Agreement standards and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) good practice can promote more ambitious and credible action;

Recognizing that, while there are multiple useful international initiatives that address methane, there is a need for high-level political engagement in order to catalyze global methane action.

The Participants in the Global Methane Pledge:
Commit to work together in order to collectively reduce global anthropogenic methane emissions across all sectors by at least 30 percent below 2020 levels by 2030.

Commit to take comprehensive domestic actions to achieve that target, focusing on standards to achieve all feasible reductions in the energy and waste sectors and seeking abatement of

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agricultural emissions through technology innovation as well as incentives and partnerships with farmers.

Commit to moving towards using the highest tier IPCC good practice inventory methodologies, consistent with IPCC guidance, with particular focus on high emission sources, in order to quantify methane emissions; as well as working individually and cooperatively to continuously improve the accuracy, transparency, consistency, comparability, and completeness of national greenhouse gas inventory reporting under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement, and to provide greater transparency in key sectors.

Commit to maintaining up-to-date, transparent, and publicly available information on our policies and commitments.

Commit to support existing international methane emission reduction initiatives, such as those of the Climate and Clean Air Coalition, the Global Methane Initiative, and the relevant work of the United Nations Environment Programme, including the International Methane Emissions Observatory, to advance technical and policy work that will serve to underpin Participants' domestic actions.

Welcome and encourage announcements of further parallel specific domestic actions by Participants and commitments taken by the private sector, development banks, financial institutions and philanthropy to support global methane abatement.

Resolve to review progress towards the target of the Global Methane Pledge on an annual basis until 2030 by means of a dedicated ministerial meeting.

Call on other states to join the Global Methane Pledge.

The End of Coal Coalition: A coalition of 190 governments, finance institutions, and other stakeholders committed to phase out coal this included five of the top 20 coal power-using countries. Major international banks committed to end financing unabated coal by the end of 2021. In the six years prior to COP26, there had been a 76% drop in the number of new coal plants planned. On the 4th of November 2021, COP26 President Alok Sharma said:

> "From the start of the UK's Presidency, we have been clear that COP26 must be the COP that consigns coal to history. With these ambitious commitments we are seeing today, the end of coal power is now within sight.
>
> Securing a 190-strong coalition to phase out coal power and end support for new coal power plants and the Just Transition Declaration signed today, show a real international commitment to not leave any nation behind.
>
> Together we can accelerate access to electricity for more than three quarters of a billion people who currently lack access, consigning energy poverty to history as we create the clean power future needed to keep 1.5 alive." (Sharma, 2021)

Global Energy Alliance for People and Planet (GEAPP): Led by the Rockefeller Foundation and supported by partners including the Bezos Earth Fund, the IKEA Foundation, and several international finance corporations and multilateral development banks, the creation of an investment fund of $10 billion established the Global Energy Alliance for People and Planet (GEAPP).

> "GEAPP aims to extend clean, productive-use energy to 1 billion underserved people, create tens of millions of green jobs, and avoid and avert over 4 billion tons of emissions. It will build a transformational pipeline of projects by supporting the decommissioning and repurposing of fossil fuel plants, utility-wide adoption of renewable energy, and reliable, productive-use power for off-grid and underserved communities." (Rockefeller Foundation, 2021)

Beyond Oil and Gas Coalition (BOGA): BOGA is co-chaired by the governments of Denmark and Costa Rica and is an international alliance of governments and stakeholders. The Coalition is working to help facilitate the managed phaseout of oil and gas production. Its core members commit to end new concessions, licensing, or leasing rounds for oil and gas production and exploration and set a Paris-aligned date for ending oil and gas production and exploration on the territory over which they have jurisdiction.

Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero: One of the most interesting and potentially most impactful initiatives to emerge is the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero. Mark Carney, UN Special Envoy for Climate Action and Finance and Prime Minister Johnson's Climate Finance Advisor for COP26, is chairing this new grouping. It announced on November 3, 2021:

> "Over $130 trillion of private capital is committed to transforming the economy for net zero. These commitments, from over 450 firms across 45 countries, can deliver the estimated $100 trillion of finance needed for net zero over the next three decades." (GFANZ, 2021)

This is up from $5 trillion when the UK and Italy assumed the COP26 Presidency.

> "The economic transformation, including the potential $275 trillion of cumulative spending on physical assets needed over the next three decades." (McKinsey & Company, 2022)

The Coalitions of the Willing have been built on the groundwork that the Paris Climate Summit laid. The recognition that governments alone would not be able to deliver this and that we needed to engage other stakeholders, particularly the private sector, but also cities and subnational governments, to play their role in helping to accelerate the work that needs to be done in helping to deliver the 1.5° Celsius goal.

Final Thoughts

The UK presidency continues up to the opening of COP27 in November 2022. The pressure to deliver further commitments, enhanced NDCs, and the contributions to the $100 trillion cannot slow down. In 2020 and 2021, the UK presidency achieved a lot and was helped with support from US Climate Envoy John Kerry.

Germany has taken over the G7 presidency from the UK. The new Social Democrat/Green/Free Democrat government has already set a number of targets in their manifesto for government. It'll be very interesting to see how much of that is delivered.

It's important to recognize that in this period where we are still in the midst of the pandemic, we've still established a large number of bridgeheads to take us to 2030. In President Biden's State of the Union address, he said we will see 50 years of development in the next 10 years. The number of new technologies, much of it green, emerging over the coming decade is critical to this development. How can we ensure developing countries have access to these emerging technologies without further increasing inequality?

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Chapter 11

Global Agreement on Plastic Pollution: On the Road to UNEA 5.2

Damaris Carnal, Switzerland's Focal Point for the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)

The objective of this chapter is to examine a Global Agreement on Plastic Pollution as well as the next steps Switzerland and others hope to achieve on plastic pollution at the end of February 2022 at the resumed Fifth Session of the UN Environment Assembly (UNEA 5.2). It is clear this process has not come out of nowhere and that a number of key processes and initiatives have already paved the way for progress. This chapter will also provide substantive background on why we need to tackle plastic pollution and the ways and means to do so – notably the ad-hoc open-ended expert group on marine litter (AHEG).

In early September 2021, in order to build support and raise awareness of the importance of addressing plastic pollution, a Ministerial Conference on Marine Litter[1] was convened by four countries in Geneva; Ecuador, Germany, Ghana, and Vietnam successfully brought all relevant stakeholders together and prepared a Ministerial statement. This important statement is now supported by more than 70 Member States from all regions. It notably recognizes the need to take the necessary steps to establish an intergovernmental negotiating committee (INC) to build upon a global agreement on plastic pollution. At this Ministerial meeting, Peru and Rwanda released a draft resolution to be presented at UNEA 5.2.[2] These two countries demonstrated great leadership in preparing this resolution alongside a concept note that specifically proposed to establish an INC with the objective of reducing the discharge of plastics into all areas of the environment by covering all stages of the plastic life cycle and adopting a circular approach to plastics. This was truly a key milestone.

The main objective of the resolution is to launch a process to negotiate a legally binding agreement with international obligations that include specific commitments and targets. The scope of the treaty is meant to be broad and address plastic pollution as a whole – not only marine plastic pollution, but also land-based plastic pollution. It also aims to cover microplastics given that not only the visible part of plastic pollution is problematic, but also the invisible part is causing harm to all ecosystems.

The resolution also emphasized the need to promote a circular economy approach and address the full lifecycle of plastics including production, consumption and design, and waste management. Dealing with waste (downstream measures) is clearly insufficient if we are going to meaningfully tackle the issue of plastic pollution. The resolution also includes some additional institutional elements, notably a reference to the need for a financial mechanism to support the implementation of a treaty as well as elements for technical assistance. There is also a recognition that scientific and socio-economic assessments are important. As more data and research becomes available, we discover even more about the impact of plastic pollution. To support this work, robust scientific data and research will be needed.

Peru and Rwanda, with the help of cosponsors, are doing outreach, notably through events in Geneva, Nairobi, and New York but also through direct engagement between capitals. With more than 50 countries from all regions in support, the resolution has significant momentum. It is expected that many more will also support the resolution.

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[1] Ministerial Conference on Marine Litter and Plastic Pollution (text of ministerial statement, list of endorsing States, etc.)

[2] UNEA5.2 Global_Agreement_Explanatory note and Resolution 27 October (unep.org)

It is also worth noting there is another proposal on the table. Japan has a put forward its own resolution at the end of 2021[3] on the same issue. Some elements are similar. For example, both resolutions call for the establishment of an INC on an internationally legally binding instrument. However, some elements seem to differ in scope and approaches. Based on an initial assessment, the Japanese resolution seems to focus more on marine plastic pollution rather than focusing on the broad, comprehensive approach we are advocating for. There also seems to be much more of a downstream focus as opposed to addressing the full life cycle.

Peru and Rwanda are in contact with Japan to quickly identify a common way forward in order to prepare a single resolution that would set up the ambitious mandate that the international community is calling for and ensure we can have an INC with a mandate that contains a clear vision and ambitious commitment to address plastic pollution in all areas of the environment. There is reason for optimism as this is already good news in the current multilateral context! Indeed, the need for action throughout the entire plastic life cycle is now being recognized by more and more actors. The call for action not only comes from a growing number of governments, but also from civil society and increasingly from the private sector. It's clear that both of the latter will have an important role to play in future negotiations.

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[3] [Draft Resolution on an international legally binding instrument on marine plastic pollution_Japan.pdf (unep.org)](unep.org)

Chapter 12

The Challenges That a Plastic Convention Should Address

Tim Grabiel, environmental lawyer and advocate with the Environmental Investigation Agency

What is the challenge that a convention would be addressing? I'll begin with the general observation that this is a definitional problem. It is a question of how we define the problem or the challenge as it were that we seek to address, and this is one of the issues that will be front and center at the negotiations at UNEA-5.2. So how are we going to define the challenge or the problem? Is the challenge that we seek to address marine plastic pollution? As we know, up to 12 million metric tons of plastic enter the marine environment every year and without significant action, this figure is expected to grow to 29 million metric tons by 2040. Is the challenge that we seek to address plastic pollution in all environments, regardless of whether it's marine, terrestrial, or freshwater? As we know, the vast majority of plastic pollution originates and remains on land, making it hard to imagine how we're going to address marine plastic pollution without addressing plastic pollution more broadly. This is an undertaking that has its own independent value to freshwater and terrestrial environments.

Is the challenge that we seek to address unsustainable production and consumption of virgin plastic, which floods the market with cheap materials, promotes inefficient use, undermines secondary markets for recycling, and complicates all other downstream efforts? Based on 2016 levels, annual virgin plastic production is set to double by 2040, increasing to two hundred thousand million metric tons by 2050. This is an unmanageable and unsustainable amount of virgin plastic being put onto the market every year.

Or is the challenge that we seek to address the linear economy whereby plastic goes through the system once because we have not created a safe and non-toxic circular economy for plastics? This would require us to address product design, chemicals and additives and alternatives as well as make significant improvements to collection and recycling. Of all the plastic waste ever produced, only 9 percent has been recycled. Of the remaining, 12 percent has been incinerated and a further 79 percent has ended up in landfills or the natural environment.

Or is the challenge that we seek to address all of the above?

Now we have before us for consideration two resolutions with starkly different understandings, visions of the challenges that we seek to address and the measures and the mechanisms necessary to address them. On the one hand, we have Rwanda and Peru. It's a resolution that's been co-sponsored by over 40 other countries and very much aligns itself with the ministerial statement adopted in September. The Rwanda Peru resolution takes a broader view of the challenges, envisioning a more comprehensive approach on the necessary interventions. On the other hand, we have the Japan resolution, which takes a narrow view of the challenge envisioning a smaller set of interventions that is less comprehensive and, to my mind, much less effective. So how these two competing resolutions get reconciled at UNEA-5.2 is of paramount importance. It will either set the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) along a pathway toward creating a convention that is fit for purpose or not. Mandates matter.

The challenges we face are all of the above, and we'd like to see a mandate and a vision for addressing plastic pollution that includes an approach to all of the challenges. You cannot separate them from one another. I would urge us all to be ambitious in our communications, positions, and lobbying so that we can have a convention that covers a broad scope of interventions, which is underpinned by a robust institutional structure – one that allows us to progressively address the myriad of challenges before us.

I will conclude by sharing three final observations.

First, we should strongly consider the creation of a dedicated financial mechanism to implement the convention's commitments. I personally have worked for over a decade at the Montreal Protocol, and I can attest to the principal reason that it is widely considered the most effective multilateral environmental agreement is because it has a dedicated financial mechanism. The multilateral fund, or MLF, as we call it, ensures predictable and stable funding to developing countries for enabling activities and incremental costs. And this is something that we should give strong consideration to in this new convention.

Second, fact-finding is policymaking and good fact-finding is good policymaking. To put this another way, you cannot manage what you cannot measure. We must therefore have robust commitments on monitoring and reporting not only on the state of the environment, as in what's in it, but on our efforts to reduce plastic pollution and promote a circular economy within our economies. And this includes reporting on virgin plastic production and then reporting on all the measures and our accomplishments all the way downstream.

Third, coordination with existing international agreements and entities will be key. But more important will be identifying where those other instruments and entities are incapable of acting. We must not assume action will be taken. For example, the International Maritime Organization has an action plan to address marine plastic marine plastic litter from ships. It was adopted and started in 2018. Given that fishing vessels are ships and many countries have been pushing for meaningful action on fishing gear , it would make sense for IMO to act in this space. What we have seen, however, is a paralysis at the IMO. The IMO in not doing anything meaningful on fishing gear. Several countries even argue that preventative measures that would prevent fishing gear from being lost into the environment do not fall within MARPOL 73/78 because it cannot be considered garbage. It's not garbage and therefore action cannot be taken. So, while we might hope that the IMO adopts measures on reporting or marking of fishing gear, the IMO is maybe not the best place to address the issue of lost fishing gear in all of its complexity. We should therefore not make such assumptions on the actions of others when designing this convention. This will be a very important point to remember when creating a holistic, comprehensive approach to plastic pollution. We must ensure coordination so as to avoid creating or continuing gaps in the international framework that have exacerbated the very problem that we're trying to address.

Chapter 13

UN Food Systems Summit: How Transforming Global Food Systems Can Help Deliver the 2030 Agenda

Zak Bleicher, Representative for the International Fund for Agriculture Development's (IFAD) at the UN Headquarters in New York

In the face of rising hunger, malnutrition, diet-related diseases and climate change, the UN Secretary-General held a Food Systems Summit in 2021 with a view to accelerate actions towards more sustainable, equitable, and nutritious food systems as a key driver to deliver on 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The Food Systems Summit (FSS) was an ambitious and expansive process undertaken in the context of rising hunger, inequality and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. The accompanying impacts of the pandemic unfolded over the lifespan of the Summit process.

The FSS was called for and convened by the Secretary-General. It did not have a negotiated outcome, as an intergovernmentally mandated process usually would. Instead, the process was intended to focus on multistakeholder dialogue and to foster collective and transformative action towards the SDGs.

In that sense, it was a large multistakeholder convening that has become quite common in recent years. However, this Summit process had some unique defining features that separated it from any other recent meeting of its kind. Moreover, while lacking any negotiated outcome, the FSS still sought to have real impact on governance for sustainable development by motivating inclusive and localized dialogues on how to achieve the SDGs through food systems around the world.

What follows will seek to: first, provide the background for the Summit, an overview of the various strands of the process and their outcomes; second, focus on the Food Systems Summit Dialogues (FSSDs) and their governance implications; third, explore what's happening in relation to the follow-up to the Summit; and, fourth, offer some reflections and potential lessons from the Summit experience. It will not address all aspects of the Summit process in detail, including governance of the Summit process itself.

Background, Purpose and Design of the Food Systems Summit

The Secretary-General announced his intention to convene the FSS on World Food Day in 2019. The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Food Systems Summit was appointed in December 2019[7] and preparations began as of January 2020.

The decision to host the Summit was taken by the Secretary-General in 2019, based on a proposal made by the Principals of the three Rome-based Agencies (RBAs) – the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the UN

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[7] https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/personnel-appointments/2019-12-16/ms-agnes-kalibata-of-rwanda-special-envoy-for-2021-food-systems-summit

World Food Programme (WFP). Their proposal was based on the recognition that food systems occupy a critical nexus point for life on our planet. They are universal: Everyone must eat. And they connect people everywhere in complex social, economic and environmental webs.

It was also clear – as it is now – that many of the world's food systems are fragile and failing to fulfil the right to adequate and healthy food for all. Since the adoption of the 2030 Agenda in 2015, hunger had been trending in the wrong direction. When the proposal for the Summit was endorsed, the latest data reflected that one in every nine people in the world are hungry, even as the world produces more than enough food for everyone. Two in five adults are overweight, and obesity is on the rise in almost every country in the world. For billions, better nutrition is not a question of choice, but of access. This reality reflects a global food system out of balance.

Moreover, increasing agricultural production to meet projected food demand for an estimated population of 10 billion people by 2050 will be completely incompatible with the SDGs. Agriculture alone is responsible for up to 80% of biodiversity loss and it accounts for 70% of freshwater use. In addition, food systems contribute up to 29% of all greenhouse gas emissions, significantly contributing to climate change. Climate change will in turn alter global food production patterns, increasing risks to food systems and threatening food security everywhere, particularly affecting the most vulnerable.

The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 only further exposed the weaknesses of current food systems and the impacts have driven tens of millions more people into poverty and hunger. In the view of the organizers, food systems pose one of the greatest challenges, but also offer one of the greatest opportunities to come through on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

It also further underscored an underlying premise of the Summit – the world does not necessarily need new goals when progress is already lagging; rather, it needs to come through on what it has already agreed.

With this in mind, the overarching vision of the UN Food System Summit was to mobilize new ambitious, innovative actions to transform food systems and deliver progress across all 17 SDGs, each of which relies to some degree on healthier, more sustainable and equitable food systems.

The Summit pursued five specific objectives in support of this vision:

1. Ensuring Access to Safe and Nutritious Food for All (enabling all people to be well nourished and healthy; advancing progressive realization of the right to food)
2. Shifting to Sustainable Consumption Patterns (promoting and creating demand for healthy and sustainable diets; reducing waste)
3. Boosting Nature-Positive Production at Sufficient Scales (acting on climate change, reducing emissions and increasing carbon capture; regenerating and protecting critical ecosystems; reducing food loss and energy usage, without undermining health or nutritious diets)
4. Advancing Equitable Livelihoods and Value Distribution (raising incomes, distributing risk, expanding inclusion, and promoting full and productive employment and decent work for all)
5. Building Resilience to Vulnerabilities, Shocks and Stresses (ensuring the continued functionality of sustainable food systems)

In support of this vision and objectives, the Summit sought to deliver specifically on the following outcomes:

- Dramatically elevated public discourse about the importance of food systems in the achievement of the SDGs.
- Significant action, with measurable outcomes that enable achievement of the 2030 goals. This included highlighting existing solutions and celebrating leaders in food systems transformation, as well as calling for new actions worldwide by all actors.
- A high-level set of concepts that would set an optimistic and encouraging vision in which food systems play a central role in delivering on the vision of the 2030 Agenda.
- A system of follow-up and review that can drive new actions and results, allow for sharing of experiences, lessons, and knowledge, and incorporate new metrics for impact analysis.

In order to deliver these outcomes, an extensive preparatory process was put in place. Some of the primary workstreams were:

- An Advisory Committee to provide strategic guidance and feedback on the Summit's overall development and implementation. The committee was chaired by the UN Deputy Secretary-General and was comprised of 12 Member State representatives, as well as senior officials of relevant UN agencies, other international organizations and a wide range of individual experts, including farmers, indigenous peoples, civil society, researchers, academics, young people and business leaders. Regional groups nominated 10 of the 12 Member State representatives, with the remaining two selected to ensure an equitable representation.
- Five Action Tracks oriented around the five objectives outlined above. These were multistakeholder working groups operating at the global level and led by leading experts from civil society.[8] Leadership for each Action Track included a young person. Civil society leadership, rather than government, represented a significant shift from similar approaches in prior Summits (for example, the 2019 Climate Action Summit where representatives of Member States led the Action Tracks).
- An independent Scientific Group[9] comprised of leading researchers and scientists from around the world. Its members sought to contribute a robust, far-reaching and independent science-base that underpinned the Summit process.
- A UN Task Force that was responsible for ensuring a strategic and coordinated engagement of the UN System throughout the preparatory process. Chaired by the Executive Director of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), membership ran across the UN system as well as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and other multilateral organizations.
- Food Systems Summit Dialogues (FSSDs)[10]: These are reviewed in more detail below, but this aspect of the process enabled governments, organizations and individuals to lead productive discussions on food systems in their own contexts, and on their own terms. With the support and leadership of 4SD, an independent social enterprise contracted by the Summit Secretariat, there were three types of FSSD:

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[8] https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2020/09/leading-experts-chosen-to-drive-five-priority-areas-for-un-food-systems-summit/
[9] https://www.un.org/en/food-systems-summit/the-science
[10] https://summitdialogues.org/

- o Member State Summit Dialogues, which were organized by national governments and led by national Convenors who were appointed following a call for nominations by UN Leadership in November 2020.[11]
- o Global Summit Dialogues,[12] which were aligned with global events on major issues like climate, environment, health, economies and jobs, and water.
- o Independent Summit Dialogues, which were convened by individuals or organizations independently of national authorities but with the opportunity to formally connect into the Summit process through an official feedback mechanism.

Key Summit Achievements

The process culminated at the Food Systems Summit on September 23rd and 24th. The Summit moment gathered 37,000 registered delegates and was viewed live by more than 50,000 people from across 193 countries.[13]

The Summit's achievements included:

- The Secretary-General's Chair's Summary and Statement of Action[14] - This calls on the world to keep the promise of the 2030 Agenda through food systems that work for people, planet and prosperity. It outlines how progress at national and regional level can amount to a global shift in progress on the SDGs, securing fundamental human rights for all. It also lays out expectations on the follow up to the Summit. FSS follow-up is additionally included in Our Common Agenda[15], also put forward by the Secretary-General in September 2021.
- Commitment from Member States through statements and national pathways - Overall, 163 Member States, including 77 Heads of State and Government, made statements[16] at the Summit. 148 Member States appointed Convenors leading national dialogues,[17] and 111 have so far submitted National Pathways for food systems transformation[18] that offer a basis for realizing the vision of the 2030 Agenda at country level.
- 30 multi-stakeholder initiatives and coalitions[19] - These coalitions from Member States and other stakeholders cover a wide range of issues, from agroecology to school meals to financing food systems transformation.
- More than 230 individual commitments[20] - These voluntary commitments came from Member States and stakeholders across the food systems landscape who sought to register their collective or institutional commitments to action which are aligned to the action areas in the Chair's Summary and Statement of Action.

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[11] https://summitdialogues.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/DSG-letter-to-Member-States.pdf
[12] https://foodsystems.community/?attachment=13947&document_type=document&download_document_file=1&document_file=833
[13] The final program and all content can be found on the Summit website and the Summit's virtual platform.
[14] https://www.un.org/en/food-systems-summit/news/making-food-systems-work-people-planet-and-prosperity
[15] https://www.un.org/en/content/common-agenda-report/
[16] https://www.unfoodsystems.org/statements-summit.php
[17] https://summitdialogues.org/overview/member-state-food-systems-summit-dialogues/convenors/
[18] https://summitdialogues.org/overview/member-state-food-systems-summit-dialogues/convenors/
[19] https://foodsystems.community/coalitions/
[20] https://foodsystems.community/commitment-registry/

- A Food Systems Summit Compendium[21] – The FSS Summit Compendium provides an overview of the engagement process and the richness of findings, knowledge, and contributions generated in the lead up to the Summit by all workstreams. Among other content, it includes links to policy briefs and more than 2,200 solution ideas and 50+ solution clusters[22] compiled by Action Tracks and levers of change teams, as well as synthesis reports from national and independent dialogues. It also includes the Science Reader[23] featuring research and more than 50 briefs produced by the Scientific Group and its global partners.
- Elevated discourse - This elevation of the "food systems" narrative and discourse is now widely seen as one of the single most important contributions of the Food Systems Summit to the transformation and future of food systems globally. Analysis by the FSS Secretariat found that average monthly mentions of the term 'food systems' nearly tripled when comparing the first and last month tracked from December 2019 through November 2021, and there was an increase of 50% when comparing 2020 and 2021. The Pre-Summit and Summit moments both had a potential reach of 230+ million people, while social media had a potential reach of 2.5 billion people over the period tracked. The online media coverage had a potential reach of 202 million people over the same period through the Summit's channels and networks.

FSS Dialogues: Approach and Implications for Governance

As noted above, perhaps the most remarkable and defining feature of the Food Systems Summit were the Food Systems Summit Dialogues (FSSDs). More than 1,000 Independent Dialogues have been organized in addition to 628 Member State Dialogues, 11 Global Dialogues and 6 Intergovernmental Dialogues, which, altogether engaged 108,000 participants and reached millions of people.

Initially conceptualized by the social enterprise 4SD,[24] led by Dr. David Nabarro, the FSSDs were rooted in the idea that while there is a "global food system", it is comprised of food systems that exist locally within regions, countries and communities. If food systems are to be better governed, then the approaches to better governance and aligned action need to be rooted in these local realities.

Moreover, in a process that was not intergovernmentally mandated and had "elevated public discourse" as a priority objective, a diffuse approach to leadership and an intentional lack of prescription was essential for credibility of the process and ownership of the Summit's outcomes.

Following that logic, there was no defined outcome planned for any form of FSSD. Instead, Convenors – whether they were from government, an organization or an individual – were offered a Dialogue method that they could use to conduct Dialogues. Nor was the method itself a prescription. The only requirement for a dialogue to "count" was that dialogue convenors complete an official feedback form[25]. With the permission of convenors, this feedback was then posted publicly[26] and synthesized into a series of reports.[27]

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[21] https://foodsystems.community/food-systems-summit-compendium/
[22] https://foodsystems.community/game-changing-propositions-solution-clusters/
[23] https://sc-fss2021.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ScGroup_Reader_UNFSS2021.pdf
[24] https://4sd.info/
[25] https://summitdialogues.org/overview/official-feedback-to-the-summit/
[26] https://summitdialogues.org/explore-feedback/
[27] https://summitdialogues.org/overview/official-feedback-to-the-summit/

To support convenors, trainings and opportunities for connections were offered on a regular basis - particularly for the national Convenors.

National governments were encouraged to conduct a series of at least three Dialogues and to include a wide range of stakeholders and across government departments. During the national (Member State) dialogues, people from different organisations were brought together and encouraged to explore their food systems from a variety of perspectives. They were asked to consider the kinds of food systems that would be needed by 2030 and the decisions that need to be worked through presently to get to this destination. As noted above, the result in 111 Member States was the articulation of strategic pathways towards sustainable and equitable food systems by 2030.

While Convenors were offered some limited guidance on how to potentially approach the articulation of a pathway,[28] the idea of these pathways emerged organically through the process and each is therefore unique and emerged from the unique context of each country and the circumstances of their Dialogue process. That said, each pathway includes, to varying degrees, a statement about the national food systems vision for 2030, the priorities to be pursued to deliver this vision, policy themes that need urgent attention, and the means through which these actions are implemented.

Wherever the UN has a presence, national Convenors also had a partner in the UN Resident Coordinator and UN Country Teams. The intention was that the Resident Coordinator could support outreach at a high-level and support a cross-pillar approach by activating the entire Country Team. In addition, small grants were made available by the Summit Secretariat through the Resident Coordinator to support Convenors in their dialogue process. Over 80 countries were able to take advantage of this resource before the funding was exhausted.

Many national Convenors also leveraged and connected with Independent Dialogues to enhance their process and draw in a greater multiplicity of stakeholders.

The recently published fourth Synthesis Report of Member State Dialogues[29] offers a great deal of insight into what is emerging through the national pathway documents, particularly in relation to governance. The concept of food systems governance[30] is being explored in real time. This exploration carries implications for how governance for sustainable development can become more effective and global objectives can be localized and translated into strategic planning instruments, regulations and incentive structures while also guiding and attracting new financial and human capital investments.

Drawn from this synthesis, the following are some interesting examples that demonstrate how this is happening:

- Characteristics of national pathway documents: The 111 pathway documents vary from general to detailed documents, reflecting the specific circumstances of each country and its food systems challenges. Some elements are common to many: 94% describe a vision for its

[28] https://summitdialogues.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/EN-Pathway-Doc.pdf

[29] https://summitdialogues.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Member-State-Dialogue-Synthesis-Report-4-March-2022-EN.pdf

[30] "Food Systems Governance is a tailored process by which societies negotiate, implement and evaluate collective priorities of food systems transformation while building shared understanding of synergies and trade-offs among diverse sectors, scales and stakeholders." – UN FSS Policy Brief on Governance of Food Systems Transformation, included in Food Systems Summit Compendium

national food system by 2030, and 86% identify priority themes that are key for transforming to the vision. In relation to means of implementation, 77% include workplans with defined implementation measures and activities for each theme; 68% indicate arrangements for working across sectors and involving multiple stakeholders, and 43% indicate milestones along the timeline for food systems transformation.

- Strengthening governance arrangements: 75% of the convening teams report that pathways are connected to and used within political processes; 70% report that the visions and priorities of pathways are being incorporated within national development, SDG and sector-specific strategies. A smaller percentage indicate that pathways are being used to include milestones and mechanisms for review.
- 70 convenors (53%) have reported instituting or revitalizing and reinforcing, cross-sector working arrangements, such as inter-departmental task forces, to support pathway design and implementation.
- In at least 29 countries where the UN has a presence, convenors and UN Country Teams have identified food systems as an emerging or priority area to be included in the next iteration of their UN Cooperation Frameworks.
- 60 convenors (45%) mentioned that they plan to continue conducting dialogues after the Summit to finalise a national pathway or to accompany its implementation. In many countries, specific efforts are being made to include Indigenous Peoples, women, youth, smallholder farmers and producers, vulnerable communities, and SMEs.
- Convenors report that pathways are used to encourage cooperation between nations on specific priorities, especially within geographic sub-regions. This includes helping to encourage connections between food systems and other major issues including recovery from COVID-19, climate change mitigation, adaptation, and resilience, promoting biodiversity, digitalisation, education, employment, energy, migration, social protection, and water.

Approach to Follow-up and Review

In the Secretary-General's Chair's Summary and Statement of Action, he committed the UN system to jointly lead a Coordination Hub that collaborates with, and draws upon, wider UN system capacities to support follow-up to the Food Systems Summit.

Between September and November 2021, the Special Envoy led a consultation process that brought together leadership and staff from several agencies across the UN system to design the approach to this UN Food Systems Coordination Hub ("the Hub"), with the objective of ensuring that it maintains the momentum, builds on, and advances the deliverables that emerged through the two-year Summit process. The results of the consultation were communicated to Member States in December 2021.[31]

The Hub became operational and succeeded the time-bound Food Systems Summit Secretariat as of 1 January, 2022, and it has taken on coordination functions to bring together and link food systems knowledge and expertise from diverse constituencies to support national progress on the SDGs in response to country priorities. It is designed to deliver on existing mandates – most notably the 2030 Agenda itself – and will work with existing UN functions and capacities in its work and existing

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[31] https://foodsystems.community/coordination-hub/

structures and mechanisms, including the UN Resident Coordinator system, UN Country Teams, and many other assets of the UN at country level and within various agencies. The Hub will act as the catalyst inside the UN system in relation to food systems and the 2030 Agenda, bringing a whole of system engagement.

The Hub's strategic objectives are focused around:

- Continued support to food systems national dialogues and national pathways through the coordination of technical and policy support requested by countries as they formulate and implement national pathways for food systems transformation;
- Staying connected with the broader ecosystem of actors for sustainable food systems, including Coalitions and other initiatives as well as the science ecosystem, and promoting the better integration of these efforts with country demand; and,
- The elevation of priority topics in the food systems transformation agenda for strategic thought leadership of UN Agencies and leading actors in the ecosystem of support.

In terms of monitoring progress on the agenda and reporting, the Hub will look at a few priority channels and opportunities. First, Resident Coordinators and UN Country Teams will contribute to annual reporting and regular reporting to the Chair of the UN Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG) on support to national pathways. Second, drawing on this work at country, regional and global levels, the Secretary-General will submit an annual report – until 2030 – to the HLPF on progress in following up to this Summit. Third, the Hub will also continue to promote a strong narrative around transformative action in food systems to achieve the SDGs and prepare a global stock-take for Member States every two years through 2030 to drive continuous progress.

A Few Reflections on the Process and the Road Ahead

The Food Systems Summit was an ambitious process, undertaken in a tremendously challenging context. First, the socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic underscored the relevance of discussing food systems, but also made food systems debates feel more esoteric and less urgent. Second, the adjustments to the process forced by restrictions on physical gatherings cannot be understated. While not a formal negotiation process, the Summit concept was largely premised on the idea of bringing diverse groups together to identify and initiate areas for collective action across traditional silos. And, third, the nature of the Summit itself was challenged by some in an environment where multilateralism itself is evolving.

While the FSS took place under unique circumstances, there is much to be learned as the UN continues to evolve processes to engage an ever-broader set of stakeholders in discussions and actions around our common future. Here are a few reflections:

Leverage and replicate the Dialogue model

Future processes – such as the Education Summit, Summit of the Future and World Social Summit – should look at the FSS Dialogue model and explore incorporating them into their approach. Even in a pandemic, the convening power of the UN powerfully demonstrated. Following the reforms of the UN Development System, it also offers a tremendously appropriate role for UN Resident

Coordinators and are a vehicle to develop further cohesion within UNCTs and to strengthen linkages with national government and national plans.

The Dialogues also offer a new way to approach "commitment making" that can actually lead to systemic transformations. A common critique of these types of processes are that a lot of voluntary announcements are made at the Summit moment, which are then followed by little action and with no accountability mechanism in place.

Food systems dialogues offer an approach to identify and overcome systemic barriers to transformation, rather than technical "silver-bullet" style initiatives that emerge from closed – and sometimes distant - groups. Moreover, the dialogue approach creates an opportunity for localized and organic commitment making by a wide range of stakeholders and for input into national planning instruments, legislation and regulatory regimes.

This also enables enhanced ownership and commitment to delivery at the country level. The accountability is then found through the direct connection into government policy as well as through UN Cooperation Frameworks and the work of the Country Teams.

Maintain regular and open communication lines; Deepen connections with intergovernmental spaces

A Summit process directly convened and led by the Secretary-General offers many advantages, but it's essential to maintain close and regular communication with all Member States to avoid confusion and benefit from their continuous feedback. Such a Summit was quite new in the food and agriculture space, and was therefore received by some as a challenge to existing structures rather than an opportunity to strengthen them. The Deputy Secretary-General and Special Envoy made a lot of effort to maintain open lines of communication in New York, Rome, Nairobi and elsewhere, but it could have perhaps been more systematic.

One way in which it could have been more systematic was by developing a strong – albeit informal – connection with an existing intergovernmental space. Climate Summit led by the Secretary-General have benefitted from the existence of the UNFCCC. It's understood that the UNFCCC is the space for intergovernmental negotiations and that the Summits served to build momentum and motivate action.

The FSS lacked a clear connection with such a space. While it does not precisely have a complete food systems orientation, the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) could have made sense. The Chair of the CFS was a member of the Advisory Committee, but a more robust connection could have been developed at the beginning of the process and may have helped to reassure some Summit sceptics.

The follow-up to the FSS is an opportunity to develop this connection and should be focused on two spaces: The CFS as a forum for consistent engagement throughout the year and the HLPF in relation to the follow-up's contribution on overall SDG progress. Encouragingly, the SG's Chair Summary and Statement of Action indicates a recognition of the important role of the CFS and the need for this type of connectivity with both the CFS and HLPF. The FSS follow-up reporting to the HLPF could

benefit from the inputs and perspectives of engagement with CFS stakeholders. The new CFS Chair has indicated that the CFS can take on systemic issues in relation to SDG achievement.[32]

Position the first stocktake as an input to the 2023 review of the SDGs

While no date has been set, it seems likely that the first two-year stocktake of follow-up to the FSS will take place late in 2023. This is sensible as it offers a good runway for implementation efforts to have impact and to assess overall progress.

That said, with the planned review of the SDGs in 2023, it would be strategic to position the stocktake as an input to the High-level Political Forum (HLPF). The experience of the national pathways and other Summit outcomes could offer strong insights, and not only around SDG 2. Moreover, if significant shifts in the SDG approach are made following the HLPF, the Hub would be better positioned to immediately support countries accordingly.

Continue to Invest in the Follow-up

The creation of the Hub is an opportunity to help ensure that there is meaningful follow-up to the Summit, but it will require continued investment of resources – financial, human and political. Through enhanced connection into intergovernmental processes and continued support to the national pathways and dialogues, there is a strong foundation through 2030.

[ii] This article is based on a presentation made at the Friends of Governance for Sustainable Development of December 15, 2021. I would like to thank Simon Fellermeyer, Benito Müller and Lydie-Line Paroz for their helpful comments of a first draft of the paper.

[iii] See e.g. United Nations Security Council, 'Climate Change Biggest Threat Modern Humans Have Ever Faced', Press release of 23 February 2021, available at www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14445.doc.htm.

[iv] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2021), 'Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change', available at www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/#SPM.

[v] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022), 'AR6 Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability', available at www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-working-group-ii/ .

[vi] United Nations Environment Programme (2021), 'Emissions Gap Report 2021', available at www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2021.

[vii] United Nations Environment Programme (2021), 'Emissions Gap Report 2021 – Executive Summary' at XIV, available at https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/36991/EGR21_ESEN.pdf.

[viii] Art. 2.1(a) of the Paris Agreement, available at www.unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf.

[ix] This article will not distinguish between the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention (COP), the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) and the Conference of Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA), all of which took place together in Glasgow, but treat the Glasgow Climate Change Conference as one event.

[x] Greta Thunberg, in 'Es ist kein Geheimnis: COP26 ist ein Fehlschlag', available on www.srf.ch/news/international/klimagipfel-in-schottland-greta-thunberg-es-ist-kein-geheimnis-cop26-ist-ein-fehlschlag; see also Damian Carrington, 'Blah, blah, blah': Greta Thunberg lambasts leaders over climate crisis, available at www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/sep/28/blah-greta-thunberg-leaders-climate-crisis-co2-emissions-

[xi] UNFCCC, Climate Press Release of 01 April 2020, available at www.unfccc.int/news/cop26-postponed.

[xii] The negotiations on transparency concluded with "rule 16," i.e. non conclusions were adopted at COP 25 and all work undertaken at COP 25 was lost.

[xiii] UNFCCC, 'Initial NDC Synthesis Report' (26 February 2021), available at www.unfccc.int/documents/268571.

[32] https://www.fao.org/cfs/resources/detail/en/c/1445522/

[xiv] UNFCCC, 'Updated assessment on possible implications arising from the postponement of COP26 and SB 52-53 to 2021 and possible way forward' (note by the secretariat, 03 July 2020), on file with the author.

[xv] Climate Action Network, 'Glasgow - Time for Solidarity and Ambition', November 2021 available at www.climatenetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/APD-2021-Climate-Action-Network.pdf.

[xvi] Zia Weise, Cornelius Hirsch, and Karl Mathiesen, '5 expectations for the COP26 climate summit', October 2021, available at www.politico.eu/article/cop26-climate-summit-expectations-in-charts.

[xvii] Climate Action Network Europe, 'NGOs call ahead of COP26', available at www.caneurope.org/ngos-call-ahead-of-cop26-pr.

[xviii] Vikrom Mathur, Vikrom, Four Expectations from COP26, Nov. 2021, available at www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/four-expectations-from-cop26.

[xix] Climate Action Network, supra note xv.

[xx] See e.g. Aglaja Espelage, Axel Michaelowa, Benito Müller, Chris Spencer and Christoph Schwarte, "COP26 Key Outcomes," at 1 (ecbi January 2022), available at COP26 Key Outcomes_ECBI 26_01_2022.

[xxi] Art. 7.2 UNFCCC, available at www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf; Art. 16.4 Paris Agreement, supra note viii.

[xxii] Art. 7.2(a)-(m) UNFCCC, supra note xxi.

[xxiii] Environmental Integrity Group, Opening statement at COP26, 31.10.2021, available at www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202111132247---EIG%20Opening%20statement%20for%20COP26.pdf.

[xxiv] Group of 77, Opening statement at COP26, 31.10.2021, available at www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=211031.

[xxv] Umbrella Group, Opening Statement at COP26, 31.10.2021, available at www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202111030956---UG%20Opening%20Statement%20-%20COP26.pdf.

[xxvi] European Union, Opening Statement at COP26, 31.10.2021, available at www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202111030941---SI-10-31-2021%20EU%20Opening%20statement%20COP26.pdf.

[xxvii] Environmental Integrity Group, supra note xxiii.

[xxviii] § 98 decision 1/CP.16, available at www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf.

[xxix] § 53 decision 1/CP.21, available at www.unfccc.int/files/home/application/pdf/decision1cp21.pdf.

[xxx] § 1 decision 14/CMA.1, available at www.unfccc.int/decisions?f%5B0%5D=body%3A4099&f%5B1%5D=session%3A4221&search2=&page=1.

[xxxi] The Glasgow Climate Pact includes three decisions, one adopted under the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, one by the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, and one adopted by the Conference of Parties to the Paris Agreement, available at www.unfccc.int/documents/310475, www.unfccc.int/documents/310489 and www.unfccc.int/documents/310497.

[xxxii] CMA decision on modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 7, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement, available at www.unfccc.int/documents/310501.

[xxxiii] See e.g. Catherine Martini, 'Transparency: The Backbone of the Paris Agreement', 2016, available at https://envirocenter.yale.edu/transparency-the-backbone-of-the-Paris-Agreement.

[xxxiv] Guidance for operationalizing the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the enhanced transparency framework referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement, available at www.unfccc.int/documents/310499.

[xxxv] Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, available at www.unfccc.int/documents/310510; Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement, available at www.unfccc.int/documents/310511; Work programme under the framework for non-market approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement, available at www.unfccc.int/documents/310512.

[xxxvi] § 2 CMA decision on common time frames for nationally determined contributions, available at www.unfccc.int/documents/310498.

[xxxvii] Art. 4.10 of the Paris Agreement, supra note viii.

[xxxviii] Art. 4.9 of the Paris Agreement, supra note viii.

[xxxix] See e.g. See e.g. Espelage e.a., "COP26 Key Outcomes," supra note xx, at 12.

[xl] Art. 6.1 of the Paris Agreement, supra note viii.

[xli] See e.g. Submission by Brazil on the rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Art. 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement, 1.4.2021, available at BR - Submission - Accounting (unfccc.int).

[xlii] Earth Negotiation Bulletin Vol 12, No. 791, p. 2 (11.11.2021), available at enb12791e_0.pdf (iisd.org).

[xliii] Proposal by Switzerland and the US of 12.11.2021, on file with the author .

[xliv] §§ 42, 43 and 72 of the Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, supra note xxxv.

[xlv] § 36 of the Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, supra note xxxv.xxxv

[xlvi] §§ 18(e) and 22(d) of the Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, supra note xxxv.

[xlvii] 31(b)(iv) Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, supra note xxxv.xxxv

[xlviii] § 62 of the Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, supra note xxxv.

[xlix] § 73 of the Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, supra note xxxv.

[l] § 75 of the Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, supra note xxxv.

[li] §§ 3, 5, 8, 10 of the CMA 3 decision on the New collective quantified goal on climate finance, available at www.unfccc.int/documents/310505.

[lii] § 44 of the CMA Glasgow Climate Pact, supra note xxxi.

[liii] § 15 of the CMA Glasgow Climate Pact, supra note xxxi. This decision can also be seen as a "first step" on the delivery of a new collective post 2025 finance goal. See Benito Müller, "The New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance," OCP 14/1/2022, available at The New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance | Oxford Climate Policy Blog.

[liv] §20 of the CMA Glasgow Climate Pact, supra note xxxi.

[lv] § 22 of the CMA Glasgow Climate Pact, supra note xxxi.

[lvi] § 27 of the CMA Glasgow Climate Pact, supra note xxxi.

[lvii] § 29 of the CMA Glasgow Climate Pact, supra note xxxi.

[lviii] § 32 of the CMA Glasgow Climate Pact, supra note xxxi.

[lix] § 36 of the CMA Glasgow Climate Pact, supra note xxxi.xxxi

[lx] § 31 of the CMA Glasgow Climate Pact, supra note xxxi.

[lxi] § 86 of the CMA Glasgow Climate Pact, supra note xxxi.

[lxii] See e.g. Espelage e.a., "COP26 Key Outcomes," supra note xx, at 3-4. Climate action tracker concludes e.g. that the key sectoral pledges announced at COP26 in Glasgow on methane, the coal exit, transport and deforestation would close the 2030 emissions gap between a 1.5°C path and government targets by around 9% - or 2.2 GtCO2e, see COP26 Initial assessment - Glasgow sectoral initiatives currently close the 2030 emissions gap by 9% - Nov 2021 (climateactiontracker.org).

[lxiii] Fiona Harvey, Damian Carrington and Libby Brooks, 'COP26 ends in climate agreement despite India watering down coal resolution', in The Guardian, 13.11.2021, available at www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/nov/13/cop26-countries-agree-to-accept-imperfect-climate-agreement.

[lxiv] See e.g. Paula Dupraz-Dobias, 'Switzerland - Compromise COP26 deal disappoints', available at www.menafn.com/1103170019/Switzerland-Compromise-COP26-deal-disappoints.

[lxv] § 36 of the CMA Glasgow Climate Pact, supra note xxxixxxi.

[lxvi] UNFCCC press release of o4.11.2021, available at www.unfccc.int/news/end-of-coal-in-sight-at-cop26.

[lxvii] § 66 of the CMA Glasgow Climate Pact, supra note xxxi.

[lxviii] §§ 9 and 10 of the CMA decision on the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts, available at www.unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma3_auv_7_WIM.pdf.

[lxix] § 67 of the CMA Glasgow Climate Pact, supra note xxxi.

[lxx] CMA decision on Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation, available at www.unfccc.int/documents/311181.

[lxxi] § 27 of the CMA Glasgow Climate Pact, supra note xxxi.

[lxxii] § 29 of the CMA Glasgow Climate Pact, supra note xxxi.

[lxxiii] §§ 3, 7, and 10 of the CMA decision on Art. 6.2, available at www.unfccc.int/documents/310510, and §§ 6 and 7 of the CMA decision on Art. 6.4, available at www.unfccc.int/documents/310511.

[lxxiv] § 10(c) of the CMA decision on the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, supra note lxviii.

[lxxv] §§ 2 and 17 of the Decision on the Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme, supra note lxx.lxxlxx

[lxxvi] § 3 of the CMA decision on a new collective quantified goal on climate finance, available at www.unfccc.int/documents/310505.